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Summary 
The goal of this report is to increase understanding of the nuclear waste repository as an 
application case for the scenario method. The project was part of the Finnish research 
programme on nuclear waste management (KYT2022). The project goals were: (1) to 
“contribute to the advancement of overall safety by distilling “lessons learned” from several 
application domains on the uses of scenario analysis in the identification and analysis of 
uncertainty factors”, and (2) to “formulate systematic frameworks and structured approaches 
which can be deployed to assess the overall safety of nuclear waste repositories”. 
The report is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 gives the necessary background information on a nuclear waste repository 
system and the context of scenarios in decision-making in connection with nuclear 
waste management. 
 Chapter 3 shows the results of an extensive literature review of scenario approaches. 
The data consisted of almost 400 articles published in academic journals in four fields 
(Energy studies, Environmental studies, Risk & Safety analysis, and Foresight). We 
identified four main scenario approaches that represent different epistemic traditions 
characterised by different goals of knowledge production and methodological 
approaches. In order to create an integrative view on scenario approaches, we 
developed an epistemic scenario framework, which is a 2x2 matrix that differentes 
scenario purposes (normative/explorative) and scenario contents (focus on the system 
/ external environment). 
 In Chapter 4, we apply the developed epistemic approach in the analysis of nuclear 
waste repository scenarios, and we analyse the special characteristics of the nuclear 
waste repository system and requirements for the scenario analysis as part of the 
overall safety assessment of the repository systems. 
 Chapter 5 presents our findings and shows how the epistemic scenario framework can 
be useful in the analysis of scenario problems and evaluating the needs for a proper 
scenario approach in the context of nuclear waste management. 
Our analysis of the nuclear waste repository scenarios concludes that the task requires 
systematic approaches that involve normative and explorative elements. In the literature 
review, we found similar epistemic features in relation to approaches called scenario analysis 
and safety analysis. These approaches combine scenarios and model-based impact 
assessment. They utilise systematic, mathematical methods in scenario development, but 
brainstorming or other types of idea generation or workshop approaches may be essential for 
improving the explorative aspect of the analysis. A nuclear waste repository creates a 
challenging task for scenario analysis due to its safety-critical character and the long time frame 
required for the analysis, as well as the multidisciplinary character of phenomena present in 
 




the system. Therefore, methodological development is possible only in processes that closely 
integrate methodological approaches with the application context. This study increased the 
preparedness for an integrative approach from a theoretical perspective. But for complete 
integration of theory and practice, a different research design (such as in action research) 
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This project is part of the Finnish research programme on nuclear waste management 
(KYT2022). Therefore, our main attention focuses on the safety of the nuclear waste repository 
system. However, we take a very specific view on this topic and concentrate on the scenario 
method. We describe issues relating to nuclear waste management only to the extent required 
for understanding the challenges of scenario-making in this context. The aim of this report is 
to increase understanding of nuclear waste management as a “scenario problem”, by which 
we mean understanding why scenarios are needed in the context of nuclear waste 
management, for what purpose they are used, and how this affects the content of scenarios. 
In other words, we approach the use of scenarios from an epistemic perspective. This means 
that we are interested in scenarios as knowledge about the future, and we approach scenario 
development as a process of knowledge creation.  
Scenarios are widely used in different contexts and for different purposes, ranging from 
strategic management (Codet, 2000; Bowman, 2016) to environmental studies (Tourki et al., 
2013; Wilkinson et al., 2013) and energy studies (Nielsen & Karlsson, 2017), from foresight 
and public policy (Volkery & Ribeiro, 2009; Wright et al., 2020) to operations studies and multi-
criteria decision analysis (Durbach & Steward, 2012). This profusion of use contexts is 
connected with a variety of methodological approaches in scenario development and makes it 
a challenging task to seize the entire field of scenarios or select a proper methodological 
approach for a certain purpose. The scholarly community has tried to take on this task, and 
the result has been a large number of reviews and typologies that present different 
categorisations and frameworks to understand the field. We use this literature in our study as 
a source, but we claim that previous attempts have largely disregarded the epistemic aspect 
of scenario studies, even if it is an essential starting point for truly integrative approaches to 
understand the similarities and differences between different scenario approaches. 
To illustrate how earlier categorisations failed to find integrative structures, we provide two 
examples. Tietje (2005) divides scenario analyses from the mathematical perspective into 
three different types: holistic, model, and formative scenario analysis. The emphasis on the 
formal methodological approach in scenario development increases from the first to the last 
one. Holistic scenarios refer to approaches that utilise disciplinary expertise and intuitive 
interpretation of various qualitative and quantitative data (e.g. trend extrapolation) in scenario 
creation. Model scenarios are generated using a system model and by systematic variation of 
the unknown or uncertain parameters in the model. In this approach, model experts select 
some of the produced trajectories as scenarios. The third type, formative scenario analysis, 
combines qualitatively assessed impact factors to a quantitative rating of relations between 
them. How the rating is carried out depends on the selected method (such as consistency 
analysis and cross-impact analysis). According to Tietje, the ‘formative’ indicates the generic 
mathematical structure behind the scenarios, i.e. the mathematics that creates the scenarios 
from the qualitative/quantitative expert assessments. 
The other example is a definition of three historic (and geographic) ‘scenario schools’ (Bradfield 
et al., 2005): Intuitive-Logic models, La Prospective models, and Probabilistic Modified Trend 
models. These scenario schools have their own methodological approaches, and they connect 
scenarios to different purposes or uses in organisations. According to Bradfield et al, (2005), 
Intuitive-Logic scenarios can serve a wide range of purposes, but the other two alternatives 
are best suited for particular uses: La Prospective models for strategy development and 
Probabilistic Modified Trend models for explorative prediction and policy evaluation. The 
methodological repertoire of these scenario schools is comparable to the categorisation above 
by Tietje (2005). The intuitive school can be compared with the holistic approach in its 
informality, even if it utilises completely qualitative reasoning in scenario development, such 
as brainstorming or thematic clustering or matrices. On the other hand, the holistic approach 
(and perhaps also model scenario analysis) connects with the probabilistic school due to their 
use of quantitative model-based approaches and trend extrapolation. Finally, the La 
 




Prospective school defined by Bradfield et al., (2005) is equivalent to the formative scenario 
analysis as described by Tietje et al., (2005).  
The above examples illustrate how taking a methodological approach as a starting point leads 
to different categorisations, which are simultaneously overlapping and incompatible due to 
different initial premises in the making of the categorisation. A truly integrative approach is 
possible to achieve by extending the limited methodological categorisation towards epistemic 
analysis. In the wider epistemic approach, the question on methods, i.e. how we can know 
something, is only one of three essential questions. The other two questions deal with reasons 
why we want to know something and what we can know in the first place. These questions 
guide our aspiration to first seize the field of scenario–making and then analyse nuclear waste 
management as a scenario problem. 
This report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides the needed  background information 
on the nuclear waste repository system and the context of scenarios in decision-making related 
to nuclear waste management. The remaining chapters (3–5) show the outcomes of our 
analyses, which aimed to contribute to the following project goals: 
1. “contribute to the advancement of overall safety by distilling ‘lessons learned’ from 
several application domains on the uses of scenario analysis in the identification and 
analysis of uncertainty factors” 
2. “formulate systematic frameworks and structured approaches which can be deployed 
to assess the overall safety of nuclear waste repositories” 
To achieve the goals, work was divided into two main tasks. First, we carried out an extensive 
literature survey to study the scenario approaches of different disciplinary fields. We did a data 
search from academic journals from four fields: Energy studies, Environmental studies, Risk & 
Safety analysis and Foresight. We selected the four fields because the scenario method is 
widely used in these fields, and they are also relevant to the subject field of our study. We 
carried out a qualitative analysis of almost 400 articles to identify different scenario 
approaches. The results of the analysis are shown in sections 3.3 and 3.4.  
The epistemic approach of our study is manifested in a matrix, which we call the epistemic 
scenario framework. We designed this framework for the literature review, using previous 
scenario typologies as a source of inspiration. Among the reviewed typologies, two were 
especially useful (Bradfield et al., 2005; Börjeson et al., 2006). What makes our approach 
different from previous typologies is that we concentrate on the epistemic perspective of 
scenarios, which has been absent or at least less explicit in the previous typologies. Our 
approach, concentrating on knowledge production, enabled us to integrate the different 
scenario approaches from different disciplinary fields into the same framework. 
In the second part of the project, we applied the epistemic approach in the analysis of nuclear 
waste repository scenarios. We analyse the special characteristics of the nuclear waste 
repository system and requirements for the scenario analysis as part of the overall safety 
assessment of the repository systems. This analysis is in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 combines the 
discussions of the previous chapters. We present our findings from the analysis and present 
how the epistemic scenario framework may be useful in the analysis of scenario problems and 
evaluating the needs of a proper scenario approach. In this context, it is important to note that 
our aim was not to develop new methods but to increase understanding of scenarios as a 
knowledge-creation field and present the existing scenario approaches. We wish that this work 








2 The context for scenario development: nuclear waste repository 
and safety case 
This section provides the required background information about the target system of this 
study. In Section 2.1, we describe the multibarrier disposal concept. Section 2.2 discusses the 
decision-making context where scenarios are needed in nuclear waste management. 
2.1 Description of the nuclear waste disposal system 
Nuclear waste can be defined as radioactive waste generated in connection with nuclear 
energy production or as a result of it. Nuclear waste management covers all actions that are 
needed to take care of the waste in a safe manner. The end point of nuclear waste 
management is the final disposal. This is why it is reasonable to do all pre-disposal steps with 
disposal needs in mind so that the total effort and costs can be minimized. 
Nuclear waste management follows the “polluter pays” principle, meaning that waste 
producers will have to cover all costs related to the planning, preparation and implementation 
of the nuclear waste management of their wastes. In countries producing nuclear energy, a 
particular nuclear waste community has emerged, consisting of waste producers, competent 
authorities, research organisations, legislation and funding arrangements. In Finland, funding 
arrangements include the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR), which acts as Plan 
B in nuclear waste management. As waste producers—following the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act (TEM 2019)—will have to put money into the fund that corresponds to the remaining 
management costs of their current amount of waste, VYR can cover the waste management 
even if the waste producers would go bankrupt.  
The overall purpose of a nuclear waste management system is to take care of the waste safely. 
For this purpose, competent nuclear safety authorities have set specific safety criteria that the 
nuclear waste disposal facility must comply with. In the Finnish case, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) has set a radiation dose rate limit criterion (0.1 mSv/a), which is about 
3% of the average background radiation dose everyone living in Finlan is estimated to receive 
annually. The dose rate limit applies to the group of people most exposed to radionuclides from 
nuclear waste. The corresponding doses to other exposed persons must remain “insignificantly 
low” (STUK 2018). 
Geological disposal is the most extensively studied final option for nuclear waste management, 
and it is currently considered to be the most viable approach. It is based on the idea of 
constructing a system of successive release barriers between the waste and the environment 
where people are living. The multibarrier system consists of engineered and natural (the 
geologic medium) barriers. The construction and dimensions of the system are defined so that 
more dangerous waste types require a system that is more heavy-duty.  
A nuclear waste disposal facility is essentially a defence-in-depth system. This means that its 
first function is to contain all radionuclides. After the system has lost complete containment, its 
secondary function is to retard and dilute radionuclide spreading from the facility. Technically 
speaking, the objective is to design the dimensions of a multibarrier system so that 
radionuclides released into the human environment always remain on a harmless level. In 
other words, eternal isolation of waste is not required because the activity of nuclear waste will 
decrease with time. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic picture of the disposal concept KBS-3 developed jointly in Finland 
and Sweden. Posiva Oy is currently constructing a spent fuel disposal facility called “Onkalo” 
at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki municipality. It is based on the multibarrier concept. The basic idea is 
to place complete spent nuclear fuel bundles in containers and bury them in approximately 
500 m deep crystalline bedrock. Spent nuclear fuel is one of the most dangerous nuclear waste 
types because it is highly active and contains long-lived radionuclides. 
 





Figure 1. Disposal concept KBS-3 for spent nuclear fuel. (Source http://www.skb.se.) 
2.2 Safety case as the demonstration of safety and the role of 
scenarios 
All nuclear waste management facilities have to be licensed. In the licensing process, the 
safety case is used for assessing the radiological impact of nuclear waste disposal on humans 
and the environment. In Finland, the government grants a licence for a major nuclear waste 
managing facility in a stepwise process. The decision procedure includes the following stages: 
(1) Decision-in-Principle; (2) Construction Licence; (3) Operating Licence; and (4) Closure 
Licence. After the closure of the repository system, the responsibility for the nuclear waste 
transfers from the licensee to the state. All decision steps require a safety case, which is 
therefore developed in an iterative and stepwise manner that takes into account the increasing 
quantity and level of detail of available information. After the Operating Licence is granted to 
the disposal facility, the licence holder will have to do periodic safety reviews (i.e. update the 
safety case) at least once every 15 years (STUK 2018). 
As explained above, the safety case is an important document at every step of decision-
making. Briefly, it contains all safety argumentation with which the licence applicant supports 
its licence application: the burden of proof lies with the applicant. For every step, the competent 
authority will review the safety case and provide a statement for decision-makers. The 
government rests its decision in each step on evaluating whether granting the licence is in the 
“overall good of the society”. In this evaluation, safety is an important argument but only one 
of many. Figure 2 illustrates these arguments and the overall decision-making context, 
including stakeholders involved and the role of the safety case.  
 





Figure 2 Safety as one argument in decision-making about nuclear waste management. N.B. 
An iterative and gradually improved safety case is required at all major decision steps 
(Rasilainen et al., 2019). 
The licence applicant, a member of the nuclear waste community, produces the safety case. 
However, as decisions concerning nuclear waste management are of general interest and 
discussion on the topic involves actors from other societal spheres, the content of the safety 
case needs to be adapted and simplified for the context so that it supports overall 
argumentation and societal discussion. (The arrow from ‘safety case’ to ‘safety’ in Figure 2 
indicates this aspect.) 
In this context, it is important to see that all actors use a wide range of arguments and their 
own conceptions on issues. For example, arguments about safety may get different 
interpretations because safety is an ambiguous concept, and it is used in many areas of 
technical and scientific research as well as in common language. The radiological safety of a 
nuclear waste disposal facility may have direct or indirect connections to risk management 
practices, accident investigation, organisation research and safety culture, public perception 
of safety, as well as to compliance with regulatory criteria. In addition to different conceptions, 
the argumentation on radiological safety needs to encounter other arguments, such as costs, 
ethical considerations and environmental issues in the contest for decision-makers’ attention. 
After many years of international collaboration (see, e.g., IAEA 2012, NEA 2012, WENRA 
2014), there is currently a relatively broad international consensus on the overall role and 
contents of the safety case. (See Figure 3 for the main components of the safety case.) The 
safety case can be considered as an established methodology used in nuclear waste 
management to estimate the long-term safety of a repository (i.e. the disposal facility). 
Rasilainen et al. (2019) briefly discussed the possible needs for extending the methodology. 
These needs were identified mainly in relation to organisational factors, such as the depth and 
extent of describing and reviewing the management system of the licence applicant to cover 
the safety culture of the company, for example. Extension need considerations were inspired 
by lessons learned after the Fukushima accident in 2011, in which the performance of 
organisations was being  studied. 
 






Figure 3. Main components of the safety case and safety assessment according to IAEA 
(2012). N.B. Scenarios are a vital part of the safety assessment. 
Geological disposal will expose the disposal facility to geological processes over geological 
time scales. Regarding the long-term performance of the disposal facility, the safety case 
defines specific safety functions for all main components of the disposal system. These safety 
functions describe how the component is planned to contribute to long-term safety. In order to 
outline what could happen to the disposal facility in the future, specific features, events and 
processes (FEPs) are compiled and analysed in the safety case.  
The safety case must take into account various unavoidable uncertainties. Methods to be used 
in the management of uncertainties cover sensitivity analyses, conservative simplifications, 
and scenarios. Conservative simplification means that, as the complicated nuclear waste 
disposal system must be simplified in any case, the structural and conceptual simplifications, 
calculation models and input data to the calculation models are simplified in a manner that 
overestimates the radionuclide release rates. It requires a lot of expertise and experience, 
however, to know when one is being conservative. 
Scenarios are mainly intended for addressing system-level uncertainties. Uncertainties can be 
divided roughly into epistemic (knowledge-based) uncertainties, which can be reduced by 
further research, and aleatory (random) uncertainties, which are irreducible due to the inherent 
probabilistic variability of some parameters. System uncertainties are often aleatory in nature, 
and formulating scenarios therefore requires particularly extensive and interdisciplinary expert 
judgement. 
This chapter has given background information about the use of scenarios in nuclear 
management. In the next chapter, we step aside from nuclear management and explore how 
scenarios are used in other disciplinary fields. We will return to nuclear waste management in 
Chapter 4. 
 




3 Framework for understanding the scenario field 
This chapter covers the literature review carried out in this study. First, we introduce our 
methodological approach. In the second section, we develop the epistemic framework for the 
review. After that, we show the findings of the review, followed by a summary in the last section.  
3.1 Methodology: an integrative literature study and epistemic analysis 
3.1.1 Research questions for the epistemic analysis 
The aim of our study is to integrate the perspectives of different scenario application fields into 
a comprehensive understanding of scenario practice. This aim is not straightforward, because 
the scenario method has been applied in very different contexts and different scholarly fields 
may have a completely different understanding of what scenarios are and how scenario 
analyses should be carried out. To overcome this abundance of approaches, we started 
building the integrative view by conceptualizing scenario-making as a knowledge-creation 
process. In other words, every scenario process, despite the traditions or choice of methods, 
aims at creating knowledge about the future to inform some action or decision in the present. 
This starting point led us to develop a methodological approach that we call epistemic analysis.  
We started from the three basic questions of epistemology: (1) What can we know? (2) How 
do we know it? (3) Why do we want to know it? We translated these questions into the context 
of scenario-making to carry out the analysis of reported scenario studies.  
Figure 4 shows (in dotted text boxes) the guiding questions that we used in the analysis of 
selected scenario studies. Based on the analysis, we aimed at answering the following 
integrative research questions: 
 RQ1 - How does the scenario purpose guide the selection of scenario techniques? 
 RQ2 - What kind of scenario approaches can be identified using the epistemic 
perspective as a starting point? 
 RQ3 - Do the application fields differ in terms of scenario approaches? 
 
With our work, we aim to contribute to increasing understanding of scenario approaches and 
their epistemic dimensions. We wish that the epistemic framework, which integrates the goals 
and purposes of knowledge production with the methodological approaches, will help readers 









Figure 4. Research questions (RQs) for the epistemic analysis. Questions listed in separate 
text boxes were used for guiding the analysis of articles. 
Our research method is an integrative literature review that aims at synthesizing the previous 
research literature to propose new research directions or models for new understanding. This 
approach differs from a systematic literature review, which is a method widely used within 
medical and other scientific fields to synthesize and compare evidence from previous studies, 
especially due to its qualitative approach in synthesis and reasoning. An integrative literature 
review can also have broader research questions and more open search strategies and 
selection of source materials compared to a systematic literature review (Snyder, 2019). 
Torraco (2005, p. 356) defines the integrative literature review as a form of research that 
reviews, critiques, and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way so 
that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated. As this definition suggests, 
critical analysis of the literature and the creation of an integrative outcome that provides new 
perspectives to the reviewed topic are essential characteristics of an integrative literature 
review. Torraco (2005) suggests four different forms of such an outcome, which range from 
the formulation of a new research agenda to different models or metatheories that open new 
ways of thinking about the topic. 
If we apply the conceptualisation by Torraco (2005) to our study, we can see the outcome as 
a combination of typology and metatheory. The epistemic approach functions as a 
“metatheoretical lens”, which we use for synthesizing a body of literature across domains (the 
different scenario application fields) to generate a typology of scenario approaches. In addition 
to theoretical contributions, we wish this typology to also be useful for practical purposes to 
anyone wanting to develop scenarios for a given purpose. 
3.1.2 Review process 
An integrative literature review has three general steps. The first step is to decide on the 
research design and goals to be able to create a sample for the study. The second step is to 
analyse the literature to abstract information from it. Finally, one needs to report the findings 
so that the new conceptions or models are put forward. In the following, we explain how these 
steps came out in our review process.  
Scenarios have been applied since the post-World War II period in various fields ranging from 
business planning and strategy to environmental and energy studies to policy analyses and 
 




transformation processes. This has generated an enormous number of scenario studies and 
publications on the one hand but also numerous methods and techniques on the other. This 
abundance of publications and approaches was something that encountered when starting our 
literature search. At first, we tried to keep the search as general and open as possible and did 
the search from the SCOPUS database using general scenario keywords. This approach 
generated data samples from more than 200,000 abstracts. Such a large number of abstracts 
was not possible to handle within the scope of this study. Therefore, we decided to limit our 
search to a limited number of relevant journals representing four different scenario application 
fields. These fields were Energy studies, Environmental studies, Risk & Safety studies and 
Foresight. These four fields represent areas that are relevant to the nuclear waste 
management topic while having a strong tradition in using scenario analysis. 
We included in the search inquiry the following scenario-related terms: 'scenario method', 
'scenario analysis', 'scenario technique', 'scenario planning', 'scenario identification' and 
'hazard identification'. We required that at least one of these terms should appear in the title, 
abstract or keywords of the article. We included in the inquiry the range of different accessory 
terms combined with the word ‘scenario’ to cover the different uses of scenarios in different 
fields. The term “hazard” was also included as a relevant term the in risk and safety field, which 
may not explicitly use the word “scenario” in their studies. 
Table 1 presents the journals selected for our study and the size of the sample. In the 
beginning, our sample included more than a thousand scientific articles. As this number was 
still too large for our study, we made another selection round where we emphasised our 
aspiration to study the practice of scenario-making. Therefore, we defined the selection criteria 
to recognise the type of articles that we wanted to include in our study. As described in the 
abstract, we required that the study apply the scenario method to a concrete question or 
problem, with the scenario method being a central element in finding answers to the question 
at hand. For example, review articles or theoretical discussions of the scenario method were 
excluded from the sample at this stage. We also made a time limitation and included only 
articles from this century so that the samples of different fields would be compatible. This 
selection process resulted in the final sample of approximately four hundred articles.  
Table 1. Journals and number of articles included in the review. 





of selected articles 
Energy 
Energy 153 89 2007…2020 
Energy Policy 151 51 2005…2020 
Total 304 140  
Environment 
Journal of Cleaner 
Production 
209 69 2003…2020 
Science of the Total 
Environment 
136 39 2009…2020 
Total 345 108  
Safety/Risk 
Safety Science 51 3 2006…2020 
Risk Analysis 31 6 2002…2020 
Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection 
29 15 2010…2019 
Total 111 24  
Foresight 
Technological 
Forecasting & Social 
Change 
126 43 2000…2020 
 









of selected articles 
Futures 122 38 2003…2020 
Foresight 78 22 2003…2020 
Total 326 103  
 Total sample 1086 375  
 
Figure 5 shows the procedure that we used for extracting information from our data sample. 
At first, we used the abstracts of articles as the primary source of information. The first step 
was to identify the purposes of the scenario studies. This step refers to the WHAT aspect of 
epistemic analysis. In other words, we identified from the abstract the goal or purpose of the 
scenario study and coded these with NVivo qualitative analysis software. This data was used 
for grouping the scenario studies into initial groups. At this stage, we had identified 13 types of 
purposes and one additional unclassified category.  
In the second step, we analysed these groups separately, describing the other two aspects of 
epistemic analysis. We called this step ‘descriptive analysis’ because the aim was to produce 
descriptions of the scenario types. At this stage, the initial grouping of scenario purposes was 
elaborated and further defined so that the final scenario types were defined on the basis of all 
three epistemic dimensions. Descriptive analysis was carried out by three different 
researchers. To ensure that the work by different researchers would follow similar patterns, we 
designed a template for the descriptive analysis. It listed the central questions of interest to be 
covered in the analysis. Finally, based on the descriptive analysis, we drafted the descriptions 
of the identified scenario types. We drafted the epistemic scenario framework combining the 
identified scenario types with findings from a background study of previous scenario 
typologies. The findings of the review are explained in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
Figure 5. Analysis procedure applied in the review. 
This report covers the findings after the descriptive analysis step, including the identified 
scenario types, their descriptions and the drafted framework. This material will be used for a 
manuscript of a scientific publication. The publication process will extend beyond the end of 
the project. 
3.2 Developing the epistemic scenario framework 
As the aim of our study is to integrate different scenario approaches from different disciplinary 
fields into the same framework, the first question is ‘What are scenarios’? How can scenarios 
be defined so that it is possible to identify potentially very different scenario approaches and 
locate them under a single framework? Moreover, what kind of dimensions should such a 
framework have? To find answers to these questions, we reviewed some already published 
 




scenario typologies. Many of the reviewed typologies were published in journals concentrating 
on futures studies and future-oriented technology assessment. Therefore, these typologies 
reflect a general understanding of what scenarios are in the field of foresight and futures 
studies. 
It seems that the generally accepted understanding of scenarios is to define them as some 
kind of storylines that describe potential or possible future events or developments and are 
used for anticipation or decision-making, as in the following: 
 ”--, the typology uses the following broad working definition: scenarios are descriptions 
of possible futures that reflect different perspectives on the past, the present and the 
future.” (Van Notten et al., 2003, p. 424) 
 “A scenario is a story, describing potential future conditions and how they come about, 
produced for a variety of purposes, e.g. to enable sense making, to inform decision 
making. (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008, p. 3) 
A more precise definition is given by Ducot & Lubben (1980) in the earliest of the reviewed 
typologies: 
 ”Scenario is a set of potential occurrences which: belong to a certain field of relevance 
(e.g. world population, energy, or raw materials), relate to a certain time period; and 
are connected by various kinds of relations (e.g. temporal succession, causality, 
effectuality, intentionality, instrumentality, and conditional probability) in such a way that 
an approximation to the whole set can be derived from a subset of basic hypotheses 
taken from it.” (p. 51)  
Even if the above definition includes the idea of scenarios as “descriptions of possible futures” 
and the “story-like character” of scenarios, by including the temporal or causal connections 
into the definition, it is clearly a representation of a different scenario tradition from the other 
two listed above. Ducot & Lubben (1980) do not define scenario as a descriptive story but as 
a “set of occurrences” that enables an approximation of future conditions based on the 
assumptions and hypotheses made in the scenarios. This definition leads to a quantitative 
understanding of scenario analysis. In other words, scenarios are not storylines but sets of 
parameters describing future conditions. 
Among the reviewed nine typologies, there was only one (Börjeson et al., 2006) that 
commented explicitly on the two different scenario understandings (qualitative storyline and 
quantitative set of parameters) and included both of them in the typology: 
 “One of the most basic, although contested, concepts in the field [futures studies] is 
‘scenario’. It can denote both descriptions of possible future states and descriptions of 
developments. We have chosen to use a broad scenario concept that also covers 
predictive approaches with sensitivity testing, --. The reasons for our choice is that 
many practitioners use the term in this sense.” (Börjeson et al., 2006, p. 723) 
This interpretation is opposite to that of Wilkinson & Eidinow (2008). As shown above, 
Wilkinson and Eidinow define scenarios only as descriptive storylines that describe potential 
future conditions and their emergence and have “several characteristics that differentiate them 
from other futures practices, such as projections, predictions and forecasts” (p. 3). According 
to them, these characteristics are: “[Scenarios] are holistic (i.e. multi-dimensional); they are 
schematic; they come in sets of two or more; and they claim less confidence than other types 
of future statements” (ibid). These characteristics certainly describe scenarios. However, they 
are not very strong grounds for excluding a “projective” or “predictive” understanding of 
scenarios. One could easily attach these same characterisations to the other type of scenarios 
that understand scenarios as parameter sets. They also “come in sets of” more than one, are 
multidimensional in the sense that they include several different parameters, and are 
schematic in their concentration on main connections (not details); and the numeric form of 
 




representation does not make them any more “confident“ or reliable, but they are still 
representations of potential futures. 
To conclude, we do not believe that there are good reasons to make strong or explicit 
exclusions between the different scenario traditions or approaches. Therefore, we follow the 
practice-oriented direction stated by Börjeson et al., (2006) and include both descriptive and 
“numeric” scenario analyses in our framework. This is essential if we want to integrate 
approaches from various application fields into the analysis. Instead of excluding something, 
it is more fruitful to try to understand the differences and similarities of these different 
approaches to generate an overview of the scenario field. This is why the epistemic approach 
becomes an essential choice for our study. 
How would the scenario typologies then inform the epistemic approach? In general, the 
scenario typologies address three aspects of scenarios: (1) purposes or goals of scenario 
processes, (2) methodological aspects of scenario processes and (3) scenarios as products. 
Different typologies put different emphases on these aspects. One can roughly identify two 
groups. First, those typologies that emphasise the uses or purposes of scenarios or take it as 
a starting point in typology development (Heugens & Van Oosterhout, 2001; Börjeson et al., 
2006; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008: Wilkinson et al., 2013). The second group include those that 
make categorisations that are more comprehensive by integrating the goals with the 
methodological aspects and contents of scenarios (van Notten et al., 2003; Bradfield et al., 
2005; Crawford, 2019).  
An interesting finding is that previous typologies pay very little attention to scenario techniques. 
Saying this, we make a distinction between method and technique, as proposed in Bishop et 
al. (2007). By method, we mean a focus on “the steps for carrying out the [scenario] process” 
(ibid, p. 6), and technique is “the particular way in which the steps are carried out” (ibid.). When 
the methodological dimension is addressed, the typologies mainly cover only processual 
aspects. An example of this is the typology by van Notten et al. (2003), which has a process 
design element that includes the type of data (qualitative vs. quantitative), the data collection 
approach (participatory vs. desk research), the resources of the project (extensive vs. limited) 
and the institutional constraints in the process (open vs. constrained). The typology does not 
pay any attention to techniques that are used for scenario construction or ensuring the internal 
consistency of scenarios. An exception to this pattern is Bishop et al. (2007), who classifies 
scenario techniques. However, their classification does not connect the techniques to any 
process goals or purposes, and therefore, it is actually a review of scenario techniques rather 
than a comprehensive scenario typology.  
The most integrative approach is in Bradfield et al. (2005), which identifies three historic 
”scenario schools” and compares them in an extensive table covering also methodological 
questions, including a list of techniques (called “tools” in the typology). The identified scenario 
schools are different from each other, not only on the basis of their historical and geographical 
origins but also due to their different methodological traditions. Figure 6 shows how Bradfield 
et al. conceptualise the purposes of scenarios according to two dimensions: first, as an 
exploration or decision-making tool, and second, as a tool for one-time problem-solving or 
ongoing continuous activity. As a combination of these two dimensions, they identify four 
purposes for scenarios: making sense, developing strategy, anticipation and adaptive 
organisational learning. They also state that the three scenario schools, which they identify in 
the typology, suit different purposes. The most versatile and informal approach, intuitive logics 
scenarios, can be applied for all purposes, but the formal probabilistic approach is 
predominantly a sense-making tool, and the La Prospective school, which has its origins in 
France and combines formal and informal approaches, is a good tool for strategy development 
(i.e. once-only activity that aims at closure or decision-making). 
 





Figure 6. Suitability of different scenario methodologies for different purposes. (Developed 
from Bradfield et al., 2005) 
From the epistemic perspective, the typology by Bradfield et al. is an interesting framework 
because it connects the purpose of scenario processes (Why do we want to make scenarios?) 
into methodological approaches (How we can make scenarios?). On the other hand, it has a 
strong organisational perspective because scenario purposes are connected to the way of 
organising scenario activity in an organisation. Even if one can connect this aspect to the 
epistemic dimension of how scenario knowledge is produced, it shifts the focus from scenario 
knowledge per se to the processual level. The distinction between “once-only” activity and 
“ongoing” activity could describe any form of organisational knowledge production, for 
example, separating a “once-only quality improvement project” or a “once-only safety analysis 
of a production process” from the principle of “continuous improvement”.  
Another interesting typology from the epistemic viewpoint is the “scenario-tree” by Börjeson et 
al. (2006). It builds a categorisation of different scenario approaches starting from the 
questions that “a user may want to pose about the future” (ibid, p. 725). The writers identify 
three scenario categories: predictive scenarios as an answer to the question “What will 
happen?”; explorative scenarios to the question “What can happen?”; and finally normative 
scenarios to the question “How can a specific target be reached?” Each of these categories 
has two variations (scenario types) that search for answers to the principal question from a 
slightly different angle. One aspect that defines this angle is how the scenario sees the system 
under study. Börjeson et al. define system structure as “the connections and relationships 
between the different parts of the system, and also the boundary conditions, which govern a 
system’s development” (ibid, p. 725). The different scenario types have different views of the 
system. Table 2 shows our interpretation of the Börjeson et. al. typology from the systemic 
perspective. 
 




Table 2. Scenario types and their views on the system under study (based on the typology by 
Börjeson et al., 2006). 
Scenario 
category 
Scenario type How scenario views  
the system under study? 




Forecasts Predictions of external factors that 
are expected to evolve according 
to certain, already known 
principles. 
On the external 
environment 
What-if Investigation of the effects of 
certain internal factors or external 
events on the system. 
On the system 
Explorative 
scenarios 
External Developments focusing on the 
factors external to the system, i.e. 
beyond the control of the system 
owner or the phenomena steering 
the system. 
On the external 
environment 
Strategic Analysis of the effects of internal 
factors, and external factors 
directly affecting the system, into 
the future outcomes of the system. 
On the system 
Normative 
scenarios 
Preserving Finding an effective solution or 
optimal structure for the system to 
meet targets. 
On the system 
Transforming Finding options that satisfy external 
long-term targets. The present 
system structure may be an 
obstacle to reaching the target. 
On the external 
environment 
 
Thinking about the connection between scenario types and their understanding of the system 
focus leads us to the WHAT aspect of the epistemic approach. In other words, the question of 
how different scenario types relate to the system or its environment is connected to the 
question of what is the content or subject of knowledge expressed in scenarios. Therefore, the 
distinction between internal system focus and external environment focus is useful for our 
epistemic scenario framework. Another, almost evident, distinction is between normative and 
explorative scenario purposes. This distinction is present in many of the previous scenario 
typologies (e.g. Heugens & Van Oosterhout, 2001; van Notten et al., 2003, Bradfield et al., 
2005, Börjeson et al., 2006). Sometimes this divide is expressed as the distinction between 
normative and explorative scenarios, or between exploration (producing knowledge) and 
decision-making (purposeful action). The division between normative and explorative purposes 
relates to the WHY aspect of the epistemic approach, which is therefore the other dimension 
of our typology. Figure 7 shows the structure of our epistemic scenario typology. As an 
illustrative example, we have included the six ideal scenario types identified by Börjeson et al. 
(2006) into our framework. Now, the question for our literature study is, what kind of scenario 
practices can be found in different application fields and how do they “settle” into the epistemic 
framework. We move to the findings of our review in the next section. 
 





Figure 7. Epistemic scenario framework. As an illustrative example, the figure shows the 
locations of the ideal scenario types identified by Börjeson et al. (2006). 
3.3 Results of the literature study 
In this section, we describe the scenario approaches that we identified from the literature. 
There are four main approaches: Scenario analysis, Safety analysis, Scenario exploration, and 
Scenario facilitation. We explain all of them briefly in the following. 
3.3.1 Scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis refers to a quantitative approach that follows “modelling logic”. In our 
literature sample, it was a common approach in energy and environmental studies. By 
modelling logic, we mean an approach in which the final result of analysis is created by 
combining scenarios with modelling. Scenarios represent some possible changes or future 
options, and they are used as an input for modelling to analyse their consequences. Modelling, 
simulation or calculation results are then the final result of analysis, and they are interpreted 
for recommendations or another answer, depending on the subject of analysis.  
A typical feature for this type of study was that they may combine both normative and 
explorative approaches, and sometimes it is difficult to separate these elements in a single 
study. On one hand, this type of study may have a strong normative starting point. These 
studies often define their purpose as an assessment or analysis of “emissions reduction 
potential” (e.g. Guo et al., 2019) or “promoting energy conservation” (Lin & Wang, 2014), or 
they take some politically defined emission targets as starting points. The aim of the analysis 
is then to find the optimum that minimizes harmful impacts with minimum cost. However, the 
overall analysis is carried out in an explorative manner by defining scenarios that represent 
different “operational alternatives” and are used in the assessment to find out the impacts. 
Some other studies may start without such a strong normative goal and aim to analyse the 
consequences of some policies or actions to the system under study. For example, Zhu et al., 
(2020) studied the effect of policies promoting renewable energies on the retail electricity 
market using a system dynamic model. These studies may use a similar kind of explorative 
model-based analysis and sometimes even use similar indicators for impacts, but their aim is 
to increase understanding of the system and effects of policies on it or to create predictions for 
the future (e.g. Trost et al., 2017). 
 




For clarity, we identified two types of scenario analysis, even if they do not necessarily appear 
as ideal types in real-life cases. Scenario Assessment searches for the “optimum” for the 
outcome or compares different scenarios in order to prioritise them. This type of analysis is 
more normative in nature. Scenario exploration does not necessarily have such a normative 
goal but compares different scenarios to increase understanding of how some factors or 
changes affect the system. Sometimes these studies may also have a predictive element in 
how they present the scenarios and report the results of analysis as projections of the scenario 
impacts. Both of these types produce their outcomes by combining scenarios with another 
model that describes the system under study and uses modelling techniques suitable for 
analysing the phenomena of interest. This model has a central role in the analysis, as it 
produces the information that interests the analysts or users of the information. 
What are scenarios, and how do they relate to the other dimension of our epistemic 
framework? As scenarios are integrally connected to the impact assessment or modelling step 
in scenario analysis, the content of scenarios need to be quantified. Therefore, one could 
describe scenarios as a set of parameters that are used as input for another model. In other 
words, scenario parameters represent the uncertainties or factors that are subject to change. 
They may describe various future directions, e.g. in technology development or the use of 
certain technologies or operational policies, the need for some resources (raw materials, 
energy), or policy options (e.g. implementation of carbon trading schemes). In terms of the 
internal vs. external division, scenario parameters can include both internal factors, i.e. 
parameters describing the system (such as the type of technology used or energy efficiency 
of different technologies) and external factors that have an effect on the system (e.g. 
implementation of a certain policy). However, we can claim that the main focus of scenario 
analysis is on the system because scenarios together with impact modelling create the content 
of analysis: Which changes we want to study (scenarios) and which impacts fof or on the 
system we are interested in (model). 
It was common that abstracts included in this type often just stated that “this study uses 
scenario analysis” or “system was studied under four scenarios” and went on reporting the 
main findings. Sometimes abstracts reported the main factors included in scenarios or 
explained that a certain number of scenarios “were developed” and gave their names indicating 
the main factor of the scenarios, as in the following example: “Four future scenarios are 
developed; business-as-usual (BAU), current-policy (CP), strong-growth (GRT) and green-
development (GRN). The BAU scenario indicates that environmental impacts may double 
without additional improvement options. The CP scenario shows that current plans to increase 
palm oil production would considerably increase environmental impacts” (Saswattecha et al., 
2017). 
As the construction of scenarios is not discussed in more detail in an abstract, it creates an 
impression that scenario creation is an unproblematic selection of parameters representing 
those changes that are known to be interesting for the study. Actually, the development of the 
model is often the major content of the paper, and it is possible to find examples of different 
modelling approaches. Examples range from agent-based modelling (Luo et al., 2009) and 
system dynamic modelling (Zhu et al., 2020, Kotir et al., 2016) to tailored modelling approaches 
(Levesque et al., 2018) and the use of general energy system modelling approaches, such as 
MARKAL/TIMES (Das et al., 2018; Panos et al., 2016) or LEAP for developing countries 
(Awopone et al., 2017; Luukkanen et al., 2015; Mustonen, 2010).  
Sometimes scenario analyses apply approaches where scenarios are contextualised with 
narrative storylines that describe future uncertainties or alternative futures. These scenarios 
are developed in a step-wise scenario process, defining and evaluating critical factors affecting 
the system and following some logic in the narration (e.g. Awopone et al., 2017). However, for 
evaluating the impact of the scenarios, these storylines need to be quantified. Another 
approach is to construct scenarios as combinations of some features or parameters describing 
the system or the subject of the scenario. For example, Yokokawa et al. (2008) developed 
 




consumer behaviour scenarios related to food consumption and packaging disposal as 
combinations of choices in six consecutive actions.  
In studies applying a life-cycle assessment (LCA), scenarios usually mean alterations of 
system parameters that analysts want to include in the analysis. For example, Guo et al. (2009) 
study the environmental impacts of aluminium production using nine scenarios, of which two 
concentrate on production growth, four on technological progress and three on energy system 
changes. The analysis approach in this kind of study follows a similar logic as what-if scenarios. 
What if we change this system parameter? What are the environmental consequences of this 
change? The goal of the analysis to find out which scenarios create the smallest impact and 
how different changes affect the impacts from different life-cycle stages. In this type of model-
based assessment approach, explorative analysis and normative goals of knowledge 
production are intertwined. 
3.3.2 Scenario exploration 
The scenarios in this group deal with uncertainty, unpredictability and the unknown. The 
scenarios fundamentally explore alternatives of something that could exist in the future. The 
future is not determined but rather open for exploration and future-oriented action. In the 
scenarios, change is usually characterized as non-linear, dynamic and complex. As Merrie et 
al. (2018) state, scenarios can help 'develop a capacity for dealing with the unknown and 
unpredictable, or the unlikely but possible'.  
Most often, the scenarios themselves are qualitative narratives describing plausible and 
consistent future states. The narratives are typically compact, ranging from a single paragraph 
to one page in length. The scenarios often have a name that is easy to remember and refer to 
in conversation. The number of scenarios is typically from three to five. In the Kaufmann and 
Lohaus (2018) article about scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations, the scenarios are 
called 'Pick and choose', 'Europe takes the wheel', 'Rally ‘round the flag' and 'Rules for the 
future', and the scenario narratives are about one page long. One part of the 'Europe takes the 
wheel' scenario narrative illustrates a typical way of writing qualitative, explorative scenarios:  
'Following the Brexit shock, EU leaders agree on a communications and legitimacy offensive 
to fend off populist movements in the wake of Brexit. Europe's foreign policy apparatus 
evolves. As the EEAS gains experience and fine-tunes its working relationship with member 
states and the EU Commission, the changes intended by the Lisbon treaty begin to materialise 
in practical terms. The center of gravity for day-to-day foreign policy moves to the European 
level, not least because EU members are happy to consolidate expensive foreign operations.’ 
The scope of this group's scenarios is usually broad, taking into account multiple dimensions 
in the external environmental, such as environmental, economic, social and technological 
aspects. Data sources can be qualitative and quantitative, even though the thinking process 
and the scenarios are primarily qualitative. If quantitative data is used, it is applied alongside 
qualitative data or as a complementary source, but not alone. For example, in the study of 
Varho and Tapio (2013), the scenario technique combines qualitative and quantitative methods 
by using Delphi, cluster analysis of numerical material, qualitative content analysis on 
interviews and a futures table. According to the authors (Varho & Tapio, 2013), combining 
qualitative and quantitative materials and including many kinds of experts are trends in 
scenario-making. 
In another multi-method study, Alizadeh and Soltanisehat (2020) integrate several foresight 
methods—including Delphi, scenario planning, MICMAC and cross-impact analysis—to 
envision alternative futures of the design and manufacturing industry. In an article about 
transition pathways for hydrogen energy, Will McDowall (2014) suggests using both modelling 
approaches and narrative storyline scenarios, as each has shortcomings if used alone. As 
Merrie et al. (2018) note, in recent years, there has been an evolution towards using diverse 
creative narrative techniques such as incorporating science fiction prototyping. 
 




Even in systematically formulated scenario processes, intuition, creativity and subjectivity can 
play a significant role when using an expert evaluation during different parts of the scenario-
building. In the approach of Kuzmina et al. (2019), industry organisations, experts, end-users 
and academic stakeholders are engaged in exploratory scenario-planning on the future of the 
fast-moving consumer goods industry within a circular-economy context. The paper describes 
scenario planning as 'a pre-strategy research activity of exploration' (Kuzmina et al., 2019). As 
the former examples demonstrate, scenario methods are hardly ever used individually, but 
rather as a part of a more extensive process. In every article of this group, the process of 
creating scenarios is simultaneously unique and recognisable, which leads to an assumption 
that there is much flexibility in the scenario techniques of the foresight field. In terms of 
terminology, processes, methods and outcomes, the scenario group is uniform and 
recognisable. Scenario exploration has two significant application areas—corporate strategy 
and policy planning. 
Explorative scenarios focusing on business strategies 
Strategic management is a crucial domain for explorative scenarios. The scenarios are built to 
support top-management decision-making, strategic planning and different areas of business 
development. For example, in the article by Roubelat (2006), scenario planning is meant to 
challenge strategic paradigms and allow the organisation to rethink its internal and external 
processes through networking. In a case study concerning the Russian truck industry (Winkler 
& Moser, 2016), scenarios are used to cope with strategic uncertainty. In the analysis of 
Ramírez, Österman, and Grönquist (2013), scenario planning is a dynamic capability that helps 
to frame managerial attention. 
In a business context, the scenario process and the project scope are usually more focused 
than explorative scenarios in other contexts. The scenario process may consist of a couple of 
workshops with the management team in addition to environmental scanning done as desk 
research. Other methods mentioned in the articles include interviews, trend reviews, Delphi, 
morphological analysis, PEST, cross-impact analysis, MICMAC, system dynamics, strategic 
radars, interpretative structural modelling and repeated cross-impact handling. 
Methodologically, there is no significant difference from other forms of explorative scenarios. 
The scenario processes usually combine multiple methods that also provide data for scenario 
formulation.  
Scenario creation can also be a part of continuous foresight activities. Ramírez, Österman, 
and Grönquist (2013) describe Statoil's scenario activities led by the corporate strategy team's 
organisational scenario unit. More than half of the group management participated in the 
scenario-planning process, and an external consultant was used to provide content and 
facilitation (Ramírez et al., 2013). Statoil has regularly produced scenarios since the 1980s.  
The 'scenario product' is typically a relatively short narrative describing a future state with 
business implications. The scenarios are usually explorative, but they can also be normative 
in the sense that they include a business goal or the company is an active actor pursuing a 
particular future in the scenario. 
Explorative scenarios in policy planning 
The policy-related foresight scenarios address significant policy issues that require analytical 
future directions, debatable alternatives and viable decision-making options. For example, 
Talberg, Thomas, and Wiseman (2018) describe geoengineering as 'a high-stakes policy issue 
that calls for research and debate that is pluralistic, reflexive and socially accountable'. The 
scenario process helps 'focus governance discussions around key issues' (Talberg, Thomas, 
and Wiseman, 2018). In the article by Bierwisch, Kayser, and Shala (2015), civil security is 'a 
major issue on the European policy level', and the research has 'a challenge-oriented policy 
perspective'. The importance of the policy issue directs the research focus. 
 




Compared to business-related scenarios, the scenario processes in policy are usually broader 
in the sense of the system scope and stakeholders involved. The policy issue may concern an 
entire industry or an international policy issue. For example, Raele et al. (2014) construct 
scenarios for the ethanol industry in Brazil, and the contribution of the paper is meant to support 
the development of public policy and be a tool for decision-makers in the energy sector. 
The methods in policy scenarios are typical for foresight processes: scenario matrixes, 
scenario archetypes, environmental scanning, expert interviews and workshops. For example, 
in the article by Amorim Varum et al. (2011), scenarios for hospitality and tourism are created 
through an intuitive-logical process. Four alternative scenarios are developed in three 
workshops, and the scenarios are identified based on the dynamics of key forces and trends. 
As in business strategy, the scenarios themselves are relatively short storylines. As Talberg et 
al. (2018) note, they can be stories of the future from now until then, or snapshots of a future 
situation. 
3.3.3 Scenario facilitation 
Bringing people together, facilitating interaction and encouraging debate are the main 
purposes of this group's scenario process. The lack of collaboration may be the challenge, and 
scenario methods are considered to be the solution. Social interaction in scenario projects is 
crucial, and the role of the documented outcome is relatively minor. The chosen methodologies 
emphasize collaboration, participation, stakeholder engagement and inter-organisational co-
operation. Even though the interaction is highlighted in this group, most scenario processes, 
especially in the foresight field, include social collaboration to some extent. 
For example, in the article by Folhes et al. (2015), the participatory scenario method is used 
to allow dialogue between stakeholder representatives, government organisations and 
communities. In a similar vein, Zegras and Rayle (2012) note that scenario planning is for 
developing a long-term strategy and potentially strengthening organisational networks and 
encouraging collaborative action. In multi-organisational contexts, scenario approaches have 
been used to engage stakeholders in discussing issues of mutual importance and gain their 
support for possible future responses (Soetanto et al., 2011). In the article by Barker, Cox, and 
Sveinsdottir (2011), scenario methods are used to serve as the basis for policy 
recommendations and to help experts and the stakeholder network discuss a shared vision of 
the future of the field. 
In the article abstracts, the methods and techniques may not have been outlined in detail, but 
the focus is rather on the social process of scenario formulation. The methods are typical for 
foresight projects; they include different kinds of workshops, backcasting, narrative 
construction, causal maps, prospective games, the six pillars approach, decision analysis, 
environmental scanning, trend-impact analysis and cross-impact analysis. Nevertheless, the 
primary methods should allow for the participation and interaction of several people. The social 
process also produces the data for the scenarios, such as the key drivers for a scenario matrix 
or a cross-impact table. In conclusion, Talberg et al. (2018) emphasize that an essential aspect 
of the scenario development process is to create an ‘agora’—a domain of primary knowledge 
production through which people enter the research process and where knowledge is 
embodied in people, processes and projects. 
The scenarios' approach is usually explorative, and in this sense, it follows the tradition of 
scenarios in the foresight field. The focal issue to be explored can be clearly defined, but the 
possible, alternative futures for the issue are open. For example, the case study by Zahraei, 
Kurniawan, and Cheah (2019) is about urban mobility in Singapore in 2040. But the 
transportation system is considered to be complex and evolving, and the future cannot be 
projected by simply extrapolating trends. The authors propose a participatory process that 
includes environmental scanning, expert interviews, focus group discussions and technology 
scanning (Zahraei et al., 2019). Two scenarios are produced in the process. As an example, 
 




an extract from the scenario narrative 'Shared World' depicts a mobility system based mainly 
on sharing models: 
‘In the Shared World, people have embraced community living and shared-resources lifestyle 
featuring two key aspects: shared mobility and multi-zone districts. Shared mobility is an 
innovative transportation strategy that enables users to gain short-term access to 
transportation modes on an as-needed basis. Examples of shared mobility include various 
forms of car sharing, bicycle sharing and ridesharing. Multi-zone districts are an overhaul of 
the current land-use plan that fundamentally change travel patterns, reducing cross-island 
travel for city dwellers.’ (Zahraei, Kurniawan, and Cheah, 2019.) 
In the group's case studies, the scenarios are typically relatively short narratives, depicting 
future worlds in an accessible way. The number of scenarios is most often from three to five, 
as in the explorative scenarios. Collaborative approaches can also help in implementing the 
scenarios. In the Soria-Lara and Banister (2018) article, collaborative backcasting is used in 
bridging 'the conceptual elegance of the scenario approach with the practicalities of 
implementation' through a participatory approach in which different stakeholders take an active 
role in building scenarios, identifying policy measures and evaluating pathways. 
The focus on collaboration and interaction makes this scenario group distinguishable, even if 
the scenarios' theoretical and methodological background is in the same tradition as in the 
group of explorative scenarios. 
3.3.4 Safety analysis 
The scenarios of this group deal with some sort of analysing safety issues and/or identifying 
hazards in safety-critical systems. These groups involve both explorative and normative 
elements. We consider the “Hazard identification” subgroup as being more explorative in 
nature since the overall aim could be interpreted as keeping an open mindset and involving 
diverse perspectives to identify a broad spectrum of hazards and a combination of factors that 
may potentially unfold into an unwanted chain of events. The generic “Safety analysis” group 
of articles represents a more normative perspective since the scenario process is done in a 
safety-critical and often highly regulated domain in which operations are subject to strict 
regulatory requirements. That is, the scenario development eventually aims at ensuring and 
improving safety as an overarching priority, and there is a normative basis against which the 
value of scenarios can be measured and justified.   
Safety analyses with scenarios generally aim at supporting decision-making in terms of 
identifying, prioritizing, assessing, mitigating and managing risks, and understanding hazards 
in complex safety-critical, large-scale systems. Overall, scenarios provide information for 
identifying potential vulnerabilities and enhancing the safety and reliability of such systems in 
the long-term. The objectives of the scenarios in this group of articles can be characterised by 
a focus on capturing changes in the internal and external environment, exploring potential 
latent issues and combinations of factors that can bring about a chain of events with safety 
significance that needs thorough consideration. For example, in a study by Ulusçu et al. (2009), 
scenarios are developed to capture changing conditions, e.g. in the technical system as well 
as in the surrounding wider environment, including relevant geographical, meteorological and 
traffic conditions in order to provide input for the developed risk model. According to Baldissone 
et al. (2016), scenarios identify top events and evaluate in more detail the plant behaviour in 
the event of failure.   
Haimes et al. (2002) argued that a scenario’s objective is to identify, prioritise, evaluate, and 
manage risks. They proposed eight phases for filtering and ranking of discrete scenarios: 
Phase I, Scenario Identification: A hierarchical holographic model (HHM) for risk identification 
is developed to describe the system's 'as planned' or 'success' scenario. Phase II: Scenario 
Filtering: The identified risk scenarios are filtered according to the responsibilities and interests 
of the current system user. Phase III: Bi-Criteria Filtering and Ranking. Phase IV: Multi-Criteria 
 




Evaluation. Phase V: Quantitative Ranking in terms of likelihood and consequence. Phase VI: 
Risk Management, involving identification of management options for dealing with the filtered 
scenarios, and estimating the cost, performance benefits and risk reduction of each. Phase 
VII: Safeguarding Against Missing Critical Items—performance of the options selected in 
Phase VI are examined against the scenarios filtered out during phases II to V. Phase VIII: 
Operational Feedback—to reflect the experience and information gained. 
Scenarios in this group are produced by using system-level data, historical data, holistic 
thinking, accidents, consequences, quantitative analysis (mathematical analysis, modelling 
techniques) and qualitative input (subject-matter experts’ opinions) (e.g. Ulusçu et al., 2009). 
In terms of scenario techniques, hierarchical holographic modelling (HHM) is a concrete 
holistic philosophy or methodology used by Haimes et al. (2002). This methodology aims at 
“capturing and representing the essence of the inherent diverse characteristics and attributes 
of a system—its multiple aspects, perspectives, facets, views, dimensions, and hierarchies”. 
The term holographic refers to the desire to have a multi-view image of a system when 
identifying vulnerabilities (as opposed to a single view or a flat image of the system)” (Williams, 
2020). 
Other techniques include approaches such as recursive operability analysis (ROA) for hazards 
evaluation and safety analysis, fault trees (extraction and quantification), and carrying out 
integrated dynamic decision analysis (IDDA) for risk analysis (Baldissone et al., 2016). In the 
study by Ulusçu et al. (2009), safety risk analysis is performed by “incorporating a probabilistic 
accident risk model into the simulation model. A mathematical risk model was developed based 
on probabilistic arguments regarding instigators, situations, accidents, consequences, and 
historical data, as well as subject-matter expert opinions.”  
Subcategory “Hazard identification”   
The scenarios of this group deal with identifying hazards or anything that could potentially 
cause harm. Overall, the goal of scenarios in this group is hazard identification as a means for 
risk assessment and management and eventually accident prevention. Hazard scenarios can 
be seen as a knowledge-based tool for process industries to screen hazards and conduct rapid 
risk estimation (Aziz et al., 2019). Most often, the scenarios in this group represent a chain of 
events that need to be carefully identified and elaborated in order to assess and mitigate 
possible hazards, manage risks, define adequate measures and prevent incidents and 
accidents. In addition, as framed by Bubbico et al. (2018), the scenario is also about capturing 
possible negative interactions between the system and its surrounding environment.   
Paltrinieri et al. (2014) pointed to atypical accident scenarios, i.e. scenarios not captured by 
common HAZard IDentification (HAZID) techniques because of omissions, errors or lack of 
knowledge. There is evidence that the consequences of atypical events may far exceed those 
of the worst-case reference scenarios. In the case of new and emerging technologies, potential 
hazard identification allows for the proactive adoption of safe design principles to eliminate, 
prevent, control or mitigate them (Paltrinieri et al., 2014). Wilday et al. (2011) also deal with 
emerging risks using carbon capture and storage (CCS) as an example. A risk assessment of 
the CCS process “needs to include both short-term potential accidents from capture, transport 
or injection, as well as very long-term risks from storage”. Therefore, a scenario, in this case, 
should consider risks both for short-term and long-term perspectives.  
Scenarios in this group aim at capturing changing conditions in complex and dynamic safety-
critical and high-risk systems, providing input for the risk model development and proposals 
for risk mitigation (Ulusçu et al., 2009); identifying the most important predictable dangerous 
conditions and suggesting adequate mitigation actions (Bubbico et al., 2018); defining 
adequate safety barriers (Vignes et al., 2012); and risk analysis and estimating the 
consequences of undesired events in terms of severity and extent (Baldissone et al., 2016). 
According to Paltrinieri et al. (2014), scenarios are means for the identification of emerging 
risks, dynamic risk assessment, risk management and preventing accidents by taking into 
 




account new risk notions and early warnings. Jain et al. (2018) indicated that the “hazard 
analysis method for a complex socio-technical system, such as a process plant, should 
incorporate the following characteristics: consideration of all system components (e.g., 
processes, human operations, equipment, instruments, and control systems), all plausible 
deviations, a multi-disciplinary team, and proper documentation.”  
In a study on risk assessment of the ignitability and explosivity of aluminium nanopowders in 
an industrial plant, Vignes et al. (2012) conducted a specific risk analysis to assess the fire 
and explosion risks of such materials. The hazard identification and the consequence-
modelling steps—especially the quantification of the likelihood and consequences—have been 
specifically designed. In this group of articles, such “designed” hazard identification indicates 
the importance of understanding the specific hazards in the given context or sociotechnical 
system. Hazards in the process industry are different from hazards in aviation; and although 
accident causation models show that similar patterns may unfold, understanding the specificity 
and contextualisation of hazards is critically important for ensuring safety.  
Data sources for developing the scenarios in this group can be both qualitative, quantitative or 
semi-quantitative. For example, in the study by Aziz et al. (2019), probability information from 
expert knowledge and historical data have been used. Moonis et al. (2010) used semi-
quantitative risk assessment by applying top-down HAZID brainstorming, consequence-
modelling using commercially available software, and the use of a risk matrix to conduct a risk 
assessment of the commercial-scale supply chain of hydrogen fuel. A multi-disciplinary team 
should be involved in the hazard identification process, and the management system should 
be part of hazard analysis, including the process safety culture and leadership, operational 
discipline and process safety systems, as highlighted by Jain et al. (2018).  
Regarding the system scope in the hazard identification group of articles, there is a system or 
process that is analysed in hazard identification. Also, the interaction of this system or process 
or equipment with the larger environment is considered to be within the scope. It may be an 
explicitly defined existing technological system, such as an industrial plant of aluminium 
nanopowder production (Vignes et al., 2012), plant (Baldissone et al., 2016) or an emerging 
system, such as Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS (Wilday et al., 2011) or the transport and 
storage of hydrogen as fuel (Moonis et al., 2010). It is also possible that the system is described 
more generally, for example, as a complex socio-technical system (Jain et al., 2018). The focus 
may also be explicitly on the interaction between the technological system and its surrounding 
environment (Bubbico et al., 2018). It could be a broadly defined and dynamic system, such 
as vessel maritime traffic in the Strait of Istanbul, including changes in the surrounding 
geographical, meteorological and traffic conditions (Ulusçu et al., 2009). 
Regarding scenario techniques, hazard identification may be presented as a step in a more 
extended risk assessment process. In these cases, hazard identification is combined with other 
methods, e.g. consequence modelling (Vignes et al., 2012; Moonis et al., 2010); Dynamic Risk 
Assessment (DRA) methods (Paltrinieri et al., 2014) or the use of a risk matrix (Moonis et al., 
2010). Cameron et al. (2017) argued for applying experience and historical data, combined 
with a Bayesian network, hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA). Paltrinieri et al. (2014) suggested a synergy of two specific techniques for 
hazard identification and risk assessment—the Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios 
Identification (Dy PASI) and the Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) methods. As long as there 
is a good safety culture in the organisation, such synergy allows for collecting risk notions 
related to the plant, equipment and materials that can be used to dynamically enhance hazard 
identification and real-time risk assessment. Paltrinieri et al. (2014) conducted HAZID analysis 
by means of two different approaches—'top-down' and 'DyPASI'. Bubbico et al. (2018) focused 
on hazardous scenario identification for Li-ion secondary batteries. They used Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify the largest number of dangerous scenarios associated 
with the use of these systems.  
 




In this group of articles, the scenario methods include established and standardised 
approaches, such as Bayesian Networks (to identify hazards and their pathways along with 
probabilities), Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (Dy PASI), Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard 
Analysis (RIPSHA), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study, HAZard IDentification (HAZID) 
techniques, high-level hazard identification (Wilday et al., 2011a), bow-tie diagrams, Recursive 
Operability Analysis (ROA) (Baldissone et al., 2016) and Resilience-based Integrated Process 
Systems Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA) (Jain et al., 2018). For example, Aziz et al. (2019) used 
the Semantic web-based Web Ontology Language (OWL) to capture knowledge about 
unwanted events in the process industry. Then they transformed the resulting knowledge 
model into a Probabilistic-OWL (PR-OWL) –based Multi-Entity Bayesian Network (MEBN). 
Furthermore, MEBNs produce Situation-Specific Bayesian Networks (SSBN) to identify 
hazards and their pathways along with probabilities. Xin et al. (2017) called for “real time 
hazard identification” since new information or evolving conditions cannot be easily 
incorporated into already identified hazards. They developed a new methodology to map 
hazard scenarios into a Bayesian network model. To capture both short-term and long-term 
risks in emerging technology, Wilday et al. (2011b) utilised DyPASI methodology for taking into 
account atypical (not usually identified) events during hazard identification, a methodology for 
including the time dimension in a risk assessment, and life-cycle approaches for risk 
management and communication.  
From the perspective of organisational future-readiness, safety culture as an organisation’s 
potential for safety (Reiman and Oedewald, 2009; Oedewald et al., 2011) points to a holistic 
set of organisational capabilities (assumptions, attitudes, values, competences, structures and 
systems) needed for developing comprehensive scenarios. However, from the articles scoped 
for this review, only one mentioned safety culture (Paltrinieri et al., 2014). Overall, in both 
groups of articles, the scenario process can be characterised as systematic and 
comprehensive, taking into consideration the dynamics of the system. This shows in the 
widespread use of well-established and standardised methods of analysis. This could be 
related to the fact that safety-critical industries, such as the process industry, oil & gas, nuclear, 
aviation, etc., are strictly regulated domains, and there are specific regulatory requirements, 
industry standards and expectations for high-quality and continuous improvement that guide 
the process of hazard identification, risk assessment and safety analysis as well.   
3.4 Scenario approaches in the epistemic framework 
In our literature review, we identified four main scenario approaches with a few sub-categories. 
Figure 8 shows where these approaches are located in the epistemic framework. The 
framework has two dimensions. The vertical dimension deals with the purpose of scenarios 
and separates normative aims from exploration. Normative goals can be connected to such 
aims as finding optimal designs for some systems in terms of minimizing harmful 
consequences or finding a shared goal or desired pathways for future development. 
Exploration, on the other hand, is connected with preparing for the future and exploring 
possible future trajectories for a better understanding of how today’s decisions and actions 
affect the future. The horizontal dimension takes a systemic perspective on scenarios and 
conceptualises the scenario content in terms of whether the focus is on the system (left) or its 
environment (right).  
 





Figure 8. Epistemic scenario framework and the identified scenario practices. The application 
field in which the practice is prevalent is mentioned in brackets. 
In the analysis, we first identified the purposes of the scenario studies—how the authors 
described (in the article abstracts) the connection between the scenario method and the 
knowledge-creation activities or goals. In the course of analysis, this classification merged into 
four major scenario approaches with some additional subcategories. The different disciplinary 
fields seemed to have well-established approaches in their scenario studies. The fields of 
energy and environment studies differed from the risk and safety field and foresight. Next, we 
briefly describe the scenario approaches. 
 Scenario analysis is the scenario approach that appears mostly in the field of energy 
and environment studies. Scenario analysis applies quantitative “modelling-logic”, 
which uses scenarios as the input for an assessment model or other type of model that 
quantifies the impacts or consequences of changes described in scenarios. The 
knowledge creation process is typically expert-driven and requires knowledge of the 
subject field and also the modelling or assessment approach applied in the study. 
These studies tend to blend normative and explorative approaches in their goals and 
the way that the analysis is carried out. It may be difficult to separate these aspects in 
single scenario studies, but the overall knowledge production goal and interpretation 
and presentation of the results can emphasize one of the aspects. Therefore, we 
identified two variants of scenario analysis—normative Scenario assessment and 
Explorative scenario analysis.  
 Safety analysis refers to a scenario approach that appears mostly in safety and risk 
studies. The safety analysis and hazard identification group involve both explorative 
and normative elements. Exploration refers to supporting safety imagination in dealing 
with a broad spectrum of hazards and a combination of factors that may potentially 
unfold into an unwanted chain of events. The normative aspect is evident in that 
scenario development eventually aims at ensuring and improving safety as an 
overarching priority in accordance with safety requirements and standards. The 
knowledge creation process is typically expert-driven and requires knowledge of the 
specific safety-critical context. Safety analysis with scenarios generally aims at 
supporting decision-making in terms of identifying, prioritizing, assessing, mitigating 
and managing risks and understanding hazards and connections for identifying 
potential vulnerabilities in complex high-risk socio-technical systems. Data sources for 
developing the scenarios in this group can be both qualitative, quantitative and semi-
 




quantitative. Scenario methods include established and standardised approaches for 
safety analysis and hazards identification. Traditional methods are applied and new 
methodologies are developed, for example, to map hazard scenarios onto network 
models or to capture the risk pathways of emerging technology. Overall, a scenario 
process when it relates to safety analysis and hazards identification can be 
characterised as systematic and comprehensive. 
 Scenario exploration typically appears in futures and foresight studies and deals with 
uncertainty, unpredictability and the unknown. The scenarios explore alternatives to 
something that could exist in the future. The future is not determined—it is open to 
exploration and future-oriented action. Change is depicted as non-linear, dynamic and 
complex. The scenarios themselves are qualitative, creatively written narratives 
describing plausible and consistent future states. The number of scenarios is typically 
from three to five. The scope of the scenarios is broad, taking into account multiple 
dimensions in the external environment. Data sources can be qualitative and 
quantitative, even though the thinking process and the scenarios are typically primarily 
qualitative. Strategic management is a critical domain for explorative scenarios. The 
scenarios are built to support top-management decision-making, strategic planning and 
business development. In this context, the scenario process is usually very focused. 
Another critical domain is policy planning, in which scenarios address significant issues 
that require analytical future directions, debatable alternatives and viable decision-
making options. 
 Scenario facilitation brings people together, coordinates interaction and encourages 
debates. Scenario facilitation is typical in the field of futures and foresight studies, but 
participatory approaches occasionally appear in other fields, too. Lack of collaboration 
may be the challenge, and scenario methods are seen as a solution. Interaction in 
scenario projects is crucial, and the role of the documented outcome is relatively minor. 
The chosen methodologies focus on collaboration, participation, stakeholder 
engagement and inter-organisational co-operation. The methods are typical for 
foresight projects, but the primary methods should allow the participation and 
interaction of multiple persons. The focus on collaboration and interaction makes this 
scenario group distinctive, even if the scenarios' theoretical and methodological 
background is in the same foresight tradition as in the group of explorative scenarios. 
 




4 Nuclear waste repository as a scenario problem - epistemic 
analysis 
In this chapter, we apply the epistemic analysis framework to nuclear waste repository 
scenarios. In sections 4.1–4.3, we approach nuclear waste repository scenarios using the 
same questions that previously guided our analysis of scenario studies. First, we ask why 
scenarios are needed in the long-term safety assessment and analyse the decision-making 
context. Second, we direct our attention to the expectations of the scenario content—what 
nuclear waste repository scenarios should cover and what they are about. And third, we take 
an overview of how the nuclear waste management field has approached scenario 
development according to the published literature.  
4.1 Why scenarios are made? 
As we explained in section 2.2, the safety case is an important document that provides the 
arguments for the long-term safety of a nuclear waste disposal facility. An integral part of this 
argument is the safety assessment, which includes scenarios to manage the uncertainties 
related to the facility. The purpose of the safety assessment is to quantify the possible 
radionuclide releases and human (or other living organism) exposure to radionuclides during 
the assessed period. 
In the international context, nuclear waste management has been considered to be a politically 
very sensitive topic. Nuclear waste management programs have been progressing slowly in 
many countries (see, e.g., national plans of EU member states for radioactive waste and spent 
fuel management (EC 2021)), mainly due to delays linked to political decision-making. This is 
partly a consequence of the poor public reputation of nuclear energy, which has further 
worsened due to major nuclear accidents in recent decades—Chernobyl in 1986 and 
Fukushima in 2011. There are certainly ethical aspects involved in the discussion about 
nuclear waste management and nuclear energy in general. This creates a special character 
on the topic and complicates decision-making. 
Geological disposal of nuclear waste implies long time scales, as the activity of many types of 
nuclear waste remains high for long periods of time, up to a thousand or even hundreds of 
thousands of years. In short, time scales are geological. After the sealing of the geological 
disposal facility, its safety will depend on the laws of nature. This means that long-term safety 
does not depend on human control and possible corrective measures (however, there will 
probably be a short period, maybe a few hundred years, of institutional control, see e.g. IAEA 
(2012)). This emphasises the importance of rigorous analysis of possible evolutions of the 
disposal facility. This in turn emphasises the importance of a transparent, traceable and well-
documented scenario development process.  
Although there are reservations in legislation (e.g. Government, 1999, 2008) for the possible 
reversibility of a decision (and also for waste retrieval), licensing-related decisions will rely on 
safety assessments done before emplacement of waste in the disposal facility. Due to the long 
time periods that must be covered, the safety assessment of the disposal facility will be mostly 
based of mathematical modelling. Experimental studies will be too short-term to be used as 
the only basis. Notwithstanding, experimental studies provide much indispensable input data 
for mathematical modelling. A specific challenge in experiments and modelling is to cover all 
possible conditions that the nuclear waste disposal system can be exposed to, e.g. during 
possible future glaciation. Another challenge stems from the strong couplings between 
different thermal, hydrological, chemical and mechanical processes inside the system, which 
by definition may interact with each other directly and indirectly.  
Guidelines by the Finnish authority (e.g. STUK 2018) do not provide specific recommendations 
or approvals on scenario methods or modelling tools that should be used in safety assessment. 
All nuclear waste producers will have to test and verify/validate the modelling tools they use in 
 




the licence application and report the test results to the authority in the safety case. Normally, 
after having received the licence application, the authority will do independent analyses by 
itself or have them done by independent expert groups as a reference to the licence applicant’s 
analyses. As the burden of proof lies with the licence applicant, the guidelines by the authority 
(e.g. STUK 2018, STUK 2018b) only gives general guidelines concerning what things need to 
be included in the analysis but does not provide detailed instructions about how—or with which 
tools—to do the safety assessment. The broad guidelines apply to scenario requirements as 
well. Scenarios are one method of uncertainty management in the safety case. From a safety 
case point of view, those scenarios, or chains of events, that may result in radionuclide release 
to the human environment are most relevant. 
Summary of why scenarios are needed: 
 Nuclear waste management is a safety-critical and sensitive topic that contains great 
uncertainties. 
 Time scales concerning geological disposal are extremely long, up to hundreds of 
thousands of years. 
 After closing, a nuclear waste repository is an autonomous system operating by the 
laws of nature. Therefore, a safety assessment and preparative measures need to be 
done in advance. 
 The authority requires a safety assessment and scenarios as a part of it, but there are 
no explicit instructions or approved methods on how they should be done. 
4.2 What should scenarios contain? 
Answering the question—What should nuclear waste repository scenarios contain?—requires 
elaboration on many aspects: what general phenomenon scenarios need to address, what is 
actually known about the repository system, and what requirements the competent authority 
has. 
A nuclear waste disposal facility is an extremely multidisciplinary system. This starts already 
from the waste itself, as spent nuclear fuel covers most of the chemical elements of the periodic 
table of elements, if not all. Many different disciplines will be needed in the planning of the 
system. For instance, material research will have to cover a range of engineered materials, but 
also natural materials. Concerning natural sciences, physics and chemistry will have to be 
complemented with special scientific fields, such as geology, hydrology, biology and 
radiochemistry. In the decision-making process, expertise in social sciences and organisation 
sciences will be needed, and perhaps philosophy and ethics as well.  
The multidisciplinary nature of the nuclear waste disposal facility, together with the number of 
different materials, makes the system coupled in many ways. This means that there are direct 
and indirect ways the materials and processes can interact with each other, with a wide range 
of time constants. In addition, couplings between subsystems are often asymmetric, for 
instance, thermal processes affect hydrologic processes more strongly than vice versa. It calls 
for coupled experiments and coupled modelling to be able to understand the coupled 
interactions. In practice, the consequence of coupling is that the effect of a technical 
optimisation in one subsystem (e.g. a change in material or material volume) is difficult to 
assess in advance, but the full effect can often be seen after at least a partial long-term safety 
assessment.  
In principle, every disposal facility will be individual because the disposal concept needs to be 
tailored to the unique geological environment. Before constructing the disposal facility, the 
geological environment will have to be studied extensively. The sampling points will be limited, 
however, as one cannot drill the location full of holes. Thus, the geological and hydrological 
 




model of the site will be based on a limited number of data points. This state of affairs will 
cause a specific epistemic-aleatory uncertainty vis-á-vis the understanding of the site. 
When considering scenarios for a nuclear waste disposal facility, one must keep certain basic 
things in mind. First, the purpose of scenarios is to contribute to the safety assessment. 
Therefore, the primary goal of analysis is to explore the possibility of radionuclides spreading 
from the disposal facility to the human environment. Figure 9 shows a conceptual framework 
for scenarios vis-á-vis the spreading of radionuclides. (It is based on a similar multibarrier 
concept shown in Figure 1.) The figure indicates that radionuclide spreading can be initiated 
by factors that are external or internal to the system. Internal factors can be related to quality 
deficiencies in the engineered barrier system and/or internal interactions between coupled 
thermo-hydro-chemical-mechanical-biological and radiation-related processes (THCMBR 
processes). Biological processes cover microbial activity. In the nuclear waste field, the factors 
initiating release are usually called features, events and processes (FEPs). 
 
Figure 9. Release of radionuclides through the multibarrier system towards the human 
environment, the biosphere. Blue indicates that the release takes place via groundwater 
discharging to the biosphere. Yellow indicates different sources of uncertainties that must be 
taken into account in scenarios for a safety case.  
Figure 9, the dotted line marks the closure time of the disposal facility. Note that while 
radionuclide spreading can take place only after the closure, pre-closure organisational 
processes, e.g. quality and management systems, can affect the post-closure evolution of the 
disposal facility. This is possible since pre-closure activities directly affect the quality of the 
engineered barrier system and thus the initial state of the disposal facility at the time of closure. 
Reducing different uncertainties requires different approaches in the sense that analysing 
organisational factors belong to social science research while analysing the other two belong 
mostly to technical and natural science research. The two scientific domains have different 
traditions, which must be taken into account when formulating scenarios.  
A reasonable starting point for formulating scenarios that represent plausible futures of the 
disposal facility system is to focus on what is known about the system. In this respect, the 
release barrier system is a relevant factor because every disposal facility has a specific design 
of consecutive release barriers. In addition, for every release barrier, there are various defined 
safety functions, which describe how the release barrier in question is expected to contribute 
to long-term safety. For example, for the KBS-3 concept (Figure 1), SKB and Posiva have 
 




defined the safety functions shown in Table 3. Each safety function is linked to detailed 
performance targets and technical design requirements. Discussing these in detail is beyond 
the scope of this report. 
Table 3. Safety functions related to subsystems in the KBS-3 concept (Posiva & SKB, 2017). 
Buffer refers to ‘bentonite’ in Figure 1. 
Release barrier Safety function 
Canister SF1 Withstand corrosion 
SF2 Withstand mechanical loads 
SF3 Maintain sub-criticality 
Buffer SF4 Limit advective mass transfer 
SF5 Limit microbial activity 
SF6 Filter colloids 
SF7 Protect the canister from detrimental mechanical loads – rock 
shear load 
SF8 Protect the canister from detrimental loads – pressure load 
SF9 Resist transformation 
SF10 Keep canister in position 
SF11 Retain sufficient mass over the life cycle 
Backfill and plug up 
deposition tunnels 
SF12 Keep the buffer in place 
SF13 Limit advective mass transfer 
Closure structures SF14 Reduce the risk of unintentional intrusion 
SF15 Avoid the formation of new preferential flow paths 
SF16 Keep the deposition tunnel backfill in place 
Host rock and underground 
openings 
SF17 Isolation from the surface environment 
SF18 Favourable thermal conditions 
SF19 Mechanically stable conditions 
SF20 Chemically favourable conditions 




From the licence applicant’s perspective, of absolute necessity in scenario analysis are the 
specific requirements set by the competent authority. In the Finnish case, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gives guidance on the disposal of nuclear waste (STUK 
2018). The content of the safety case is described in Annex A of this document. First, scenarios 
are mentioned in the general description of the purpose of the safety case: “-- compliance with 
the requirements concerning long-term radiation safety, and the suitability of the disposal 
method and disposal site, shall be proven through a safety case that must analyse both 
expected evolution scenarios and unlikely events impairing long-term safety.“ (STUK 
2018, p. 19, highlighting added).  
Two out of the twelve items guide the content and construction of scenarios. Item A04 gives 
guidance about the content of scenarios, and item A05 defines three types of scenarios. In 
addition to these items, scenarios are mentioned twice in connection with the overall safety 
assessment process. According to the instruction (item 06), the analysis of radiological impacts 
should be based on conceptual models of the system’s safety functions and the release and 
mitigation processes of radionuclides—and eventually mathematical simplifications of these 
conceptual models. These models and the input data that is used in the analysis “shall be 
 




consistent with the scenario, assessment period and disposal system” (item A07). In item A10, 
it is said that it is also possible to use “complementary considerations, such as calculations by 
simplified methods, comparisons with natural analogues, or observations of the geological 
history of the disposal site” if “a scenario cannot be comprehensively and reasonably assessed 
by means of quantitative safety analyses.” According to item A10, “the significance of such 
considerations grows as the assessment period increases, and safety evaluations extending 
beyond the time horizon of one million years can mainly be based on complementary 
considerations.” 
From these rather fragmented items, it is possible to compose some expectations that that 
authority imposes on scenario analysis. The first observation is that the scope of analysis is 
divided into “expected evolution” and something else that stems from “unlikely events”. This 
division introduces the concept of probability or likelihood in the analysis because there is a 
future that is “expected” to happen. However, the text uses the plural form when talking about 
the expected evolution scenarios. This implies that there can be several futures that are in the 
range of expectations and that scenario analysis should cover these. About the content of 
scenarios, the document gives the following instruction:  
“A04. The scenarios shall be systematically composed to cover any events and 
factors that may be of relevance to long-term safety and that may arise from: 
a. external factors, such as climate changes, geological processes 
and events or human actions; 
b. radiological, mechanical, thermal, hydrological, chemical, 
biological and radiation-related factors internal to the disposal 
system; 
c. quality non-conformances in the barriers; and 
the combined effects of all the aforementioned factors.” (STUK 
2018, p. 19). 
The above instruction conceptualises scenarios from the system perspective, as scenarios are 
presented as combinations of factors that are external (point a) and internal (points b and c) to 
the system. For the question—how should scenarios be composed?—the document gives very 
little guidance. As can be seen in the quote above, the only instruction is that scenarios “shall 
be systematically composed”. However, there is a clear implication of the overall scenario 
analysis process in the document. Scenarios are needed for assessing long-term safety and 
the “suitability” of the proposed disposal concept—as well as the location—for the purpose. 
This assessment should be carried out using models of the system, and the models and input 
data should be consistent with scenarios. This implies that scenarios need to be descriptions 
of the “expected evolution” of the system (i.e. possible combinations of different factors 
affecting the system over time). Based on these descriptions, one should be able to produce 
input data for impact assessment modelling as well as to evaluate the consistency of the 
models with these expected evolutions.  
In addition to the expected evolutions, there should be more scenarios that represent some 
“unlikely” events. The different scenario types to be included in the safety case are defined in 
the instructions as follows: 
“A05. The base scenario shall assume that the performance targets defined for 
each safety function are met. The influence of declined performance of one or 
several safety functions shall be analysed by means of variant scenarios. 
Disturbance scenarios shall be constructed for the analysis of unlikely events 
impairing long-term safety referred to in para. 316. The argumentation for the 
assumed extent of the declined performance of a safety function shall be 
presented.” (STUK 2018, p. 19, highlighting added). 
The definition of disturbance scenario makes a direct reference to unlikely events, so it is 
reasonable to assume that the other two scenario types are meant to refer to the other goal of 
 




scenario analysis, i.e. analysing the expected evolution of the system. This means that, by 
definition, in the range of expected evolutions of the disposal system, there is one in which the 
performance targets of each safety function are met and an (unknown) number of alternatives 
in which the performance of one or several safety functions have declined. The challenge 
imposed on the licence applicant in scenario development is to create an adequate number of 
these scenarios to prove the long-term safety of the nuclear waste repository. 
Scenario content can be discussed in terms of the system (the factors that scenarios should 
include) and time. The question of time is covered implicitly in the guideline document (STUK 
2018). As was described above, the guidance accepts that scenarios and a numeric safety 
assessment may not be “comprehensive”, and they can be supported by “complementary 
considerations”, especially when the assessment period is very long. In this context, the 
document states that time horizons going beyond a million years are most likely necessary to 
cover with complementary considerations instead of scenarios. This statement implies that 
scenario analysis should be a reasonable approach for the safety assessment of the repository 
system, at least for the first million years after the closure. 
Summary of what scenarios should contain: 
 The purpose of scenarios is to contribute to the safety assessment. The radiological 
impact of the nuclear waste repository is caused by the possible spreading of 
radionuclides to the biosphere. Therefore, the primary goal of scenario analysis is to 
explore the possibility of radionuclides spreading from the disposal facility to the human 
environment. 
 A nuclear waste repository is a complex system, requiring the analysis of coupled 
phenomena and implementing multidisciplinary knowledge. The multibarrier system 
design and the safety functions are the known aspects of the disposal facility, which 
can be taken as a starting point in scenario development. 
 The license applicant needs to follow the requirements of the competent authority in 
constructing scenarios, but the authority provides practically no instructions on how to 
make scenarios. The only instruction is that scenarios “shall be systematically 
composed”. In addition, the instruction involves conceptions that demand approaches 
covering both probability/likelihood and exploration in the analysis. According to the 
instructions, scenarios should include factors that are both internal and external to the 
nuclear waste repository system.  
4.3 How does the nuclear waste community approach scenarios?  
Scenario approaches and methodologies in connection with nuclear waste disposal projects 
have been discussed, compared and reported for at least 30 years. Despite some differences 
in detail, most projects have adopted broadly similar approaches (and ended up with rather 
similar sets of scenarios to analyse). 
The most relevant international expert organisations in the nuclear field are the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD NEA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association (WENRA). OECD NEA develops co-operation between nuclear industries, while 
the other two are organisations for the regulatory parties. These organisations have worked 
for decades to define a defendable “prototype” for safety case, see e.g. IAEA (2012), NEA 
(2012), WENRA (2014). This collaboration also includes scenarios as a central component of 
the safety case (in particular, the safety assessment, as was shown in Figure 3), and 
international considerations have served as models when individual national projects have 
developed their own safety cases.  
Different general approaches related to scenarios have been discussed, e.g. the top-down or 
bottom-up approaches (e.g. IAEA 2012). Top-down scenario approaches start from the defined 
 




safety functions, that is, from how individual release barriers are supposed to operate. Because 
of their central role, safety functions have also been studied separately (e.g. Posiva & SKB 
2017). Bottom-up approaches start from considerations on what could happen to the disposal 
facility. This leads to analysing features, events and processes (FEPs). Various organisations 
(e.g. NEA 2019) have developed international databases of FEPs, from which individual 
projects can develop their own subsets. 
International expert group reports do not usually discuss the scenario methodology in detail. 
They do not provide any instructions or proposals on how scenarios have been, or should, be 
identified and formulated. Therefore, we need to turn to academic studies in this field. 
Tosoni et al. (2018) have reviewed the scenario approaches of 14 safety cases in 9 countries 
reported between 1993 and 2012. Their main focus was on the comprehensiveness of the set 
of scenarios selected for safety assessment. By comprehensiveness, they mean that all FEPs 
that significantly influence the system are identified. This is a more defined set of FEPs than 
what is needed for the description of the complete disposal system. The writers refer to the 
latter using the concept of completeness. The central findings of the review were (1) one must 
clarify why scenarios have focused on a limited set of FEPs, (2) there is not a consensus on 
the interpretation of comprehensiveness that could guide scenario formulation work, and (3) 
there is a need to analyse epistemic uncertainties in more detail.  
Tosoni et al. (ibid.) divided the scenario approaches of safety cases into pluralistic and 
probabilistic ones. In pluralistic approaches, there are a relatively limited number of scenarios 
that reflect different assumptions by experts. In probabilistic approaches, scenarios are 
generated as subsets from a large random sample of futures. Of the safety cases reviewed, 
ten were classified into pluralistic and four into probabilistic approaches. Probabilistic 
approaches have lost popularity in the 1990s. The authors emphasize the role of the system 
model in scenario development. They also discuss the comprehensiveness of the FEP list, 
which subsequently affects the comprehensiveness of the developed scenarios because the 
identification of FEPs is the first step in scenario development. They consider 
comprehensiveness to be a more meaningful (and obtainable) goal in scenario analysis than 
completeness.  
Summary of scenario approaches: 
 International expert organisations have studied safety cases and scenario analysis as 
one part of it. For instance, top-down and bottom-up approaches have been identified 
as scenario approaches. 
 There is no international consensus about the interpretation of comprehensiveness that 
could guide scenario formulation work. 
 
 




5 Discussion - Analysis of the safety case as a scenario problem 
This chapter summarises the discussion in previous chapters and analyses nuclear waste 
repository scenarios as a scenario problem. We analyse nuclear waste repository scenarios 
using the epistemic scenario framework that we developed in Chapter 3 and relate the needs 
and requirements of nuclear waste repository scenarios (as presented in Chapter 4) to the 
scenario types that we identified in the literature. The two dimensions of the epistemic 
framework guide us in thinking about the contents of scenarios in relation to the characteristics 
of a nuclear waste repository system and the purpose of scenarios in the decision-making 
context. The latter aspect is necessary for evaluating whether there is a need for a normative 
or explorative approach to scenario creation. 
As explained in Chapter 2, scenarios are an essential part of the long-term safety assessment 
of the nuclear waste repository. After the disposal of nuclear waste in the repository, it is 
closed. The purpose of the repository system is to contain and retard dangerous nuclear waste 
for so long that it is not harmful anymore. The period after the closure is the main concern of 
the safety assessment. In this period, we can conceptualise the repository system as an 
autonomous system because its ability to fulfil its purpose is dependent on the performance of 
the multibarrier system and affected by the laws of nature rather than on human control or 
corrective measures. To analyse the performance of the repository system, there are two 
aspects that one knows about the system: (1) the multibarrier system that is designed and 
constructed for delaying and limiting the spreading of radionuclides from the repository, and 
(2) the safety functions defined for all main components in the multibarrier system. 
In the field of nuclear waste management, mathematical modelling of long-term safety has 
been developed systematically for at least forty years. As discussed in Section 2.2, this work 
has resulted in the development of the safety case as a well-established tool for estimating the 
radiological impact of a nuclear waste repository. Scenario analysis is one important 
component in the safety case, which is expected to cover the uncertainties in relation to 
evolving futures. From this perspective, it is evident that the main emphasis of scenario 
creation is in the system. Scenario analysis is expected to give insight into such questions as: 
“What might happen in the system in the forthcoming centuries?”, “Which (internal) processes 
or (external) disturbances might affect the system’s performance with regard to long-term 
safety?”, “What are the consequences for long-term safety if something unfavourable happens 
and the system does not function as planned?”, “In which conditions might the system not fulfil 
the requirement of ‘being safe’?” 
How do the previous questions relate to the scenario approaches that we identified and 
described in Chapter 3? The first observation is that the emphasis is on the system—what 
might happen in or to the system, and how the system possibly affects its environment. The 
second observation is that these questions—and their connection to the overall purpose of 
safety assessment—interweave normative and explorative elements. On the one hand, one 
needs to show that the system is (and will be) safe; and in order to do that, one should be able 
to anticipate all possible/plausible developments and causes that might threaten it. These 
epistemic aspects make the nuclear waste repository scenarios similar to those approaches 
that we called scenario analysis and safety analysis and presented in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
Characteristic of these scenario approaches is that it is not easy to separate the normative and 
explorative aspects from each other. Normative aims can be achieved through explorative 
analysis, and explorative purposes may be enforced using normative comparisons between 
scenarios in terms of some assessment variables. 
If we compare nuclear waste repository scenarios to the normative scenario analyses, e.g. the 
Life-cycle Assessment (LCA), we can find an important difference. In LCA studies, the primary 
goal of assessment is to find an optimal scenario that minimizes the harmful consequences. 
In the safety assessment of a nuclear waste repository, the normative aspect stems from the 
requirement to show that the proposed repository is safe. In this connection, “safe” means that 
 




the releasing radionuclides discharging into the biosphere cause estimated dose rates (Sv/a) 
and release rates (Bg/a) that fall below the safety criteria defined by the nuclear safety authority 
(in Finland STUK). In principle, only a safe nuclear waste repository is possible because, by 
definition, a disposal facility failing to comply with safety criteria will not be licenced. This aspect 
highlights the importance of the safety assessment in decision-making. 
Thus, we can formulate a task for the safety assessment of nuclear waste repository: A safety 
assessment including its scenarios has to demonstrate that the designed repository is safe. 
This means that a licence applicant needs to analyse and assess the safety of the system in 
advance (before the government grants the licence and before the repository closes). This 
aspect emphasizes the explorative nature of repository scenarios because there should be full 
confidence in the coverage or comprehensiveness of the assessment. For scenarios, this 
means that all important or all possible and essential internal processes and external factors 
(disturbances) are taken into account in scenario development. 
The process of scenario analysis can be simplified into three steps: (1) Development of 
scenarios; (2) Quantification of scenarios for the impact assessment; and (3) Impact 
assessment using a suitable method or model. The difference between the normative and 
explorative variants is in how they emphasise the different steps of the process. For the 
normative approaches, such as LCA studies, scenarios are something that can be constructed 
using “informed expertise” in the selection of “proper parameters” for the analysis. An 
understanding of the system under consideration—for example, knowledge of which 
processes produce emissions and which factors affect these processes—guides the selection 
of the scenario parameters. This selection appears less problematic than the assessment 
method, which is needed for the third step. In LCA studies, this may mean a discussion on 
how the system boundary should be defined (i.e. what is included in the system and what is 
left outside) or how the emissions should be allocated between the different parts of the 
system. 
For the explorative variant of scenario analysis, the emphasis between scenario development 
and impact assessment is different. Scenario development is in a key role in the realisation of 
the explorative aspect of the analysis. Imagination, open-mindedness but also rigour and 
systematic precision can support the explorative aspiration of analysis, which is the aspiration 
to include all possible factors causing uncertainties or unknown consequences in the system 
or its environment. However, this does not mean that the assessment step would not require 
great effort or be a straightforward task without some tricky decisions. For example, developing 
a system dynamic model requires great effort and involves similar decisions about system 
boundaries as in LCA models, while using a general energy system modelling approach 
requires effort in localizing the model to represent the local conditions. This is actually a kind 
of paradox in the explorative scenario analysis. On the one hand, one needs to separate 
scenario development from the impact assessment in order to ensure the explorative aspect 
of analysis. On the other hand, it is not possible to separate the scenario analysis from the 
assessment step because it is needed for getting the “result” or outcome from the analysis.  
The intermediary step between scenario development and impact assessment—the 
quantification of scenarios—is not without significance, even if it often appears as just a 
mechanical “selection of parameter values”. It is important to remember that the scenario 
analysis process produces information only on those alternatives and those conditions that are 
included in the analysis throughout the process. In every step, something is left out that was 
there in the previous step, and this reduces the amount of knowledge that is produced. All 
factors that are left out from the scenario development limit the range of possible futures and 
influencing mechanisms that can be covered. All scenarios that are left out of the 
quantification—and all ranges that are left out in quantification—limit the range of possible 
futures that are studied. Finally, all aspects of the system that are left outside the model 
boundary limit the amount of knowledge that is produced. In conclusion, scenario analysis 
produces knowledge on only those aspects that are included in the analysis in all steps. Yet, 
all these “limitations” need to be made in order to carry out the analysis till the end and produce 
 




the results from the scenario analysis. Therefore, it becomes essential to separate all the steps 
from each other and document all choices and decisions transparently. 
Table 4 shows a proposal for an analysis scheme that can be used for developing a scenario 
analysis approach for nuclear waste repository scenarios. It contains questions that are 
intended for designing or evaluating the scenario process.   
An essential starting point in scenario analysis is to know the system that is studied, what kind 
of phenomena or processes there are that affect the operation of the system, and what kind of 
impacts these have on each other and on the whole system. For the repository system 
scenarios, the safety functions of the multibarrier system are a starting point for this analysis. 
As explained above, the complexity of the system and the wide range of disciplinary knowledge 
required in this analysis create challenges for this task. Therefore, this phase requires 
methodological approaches that support collaboration between subject-matter experts and 
allow the analysis of possible chains of events to identify critical factors and the analysis of the 
cross-impacts of these factors. For this purpose, well-tested methodological models can be 
found from the field of safety analysis (e.g. event trees, cross-impact assessment). After a 
thorough analysis of the influencing factors and their importance, combinations of these factors 
should be made. In quantitative approaches, this is a mathematical operation that produces a 
large number of combinations. One challenge is to develop methods for selecting an adequate 
number of scenarios so that the goals of safety assessment are achieved.  
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Which factors may 
decrease the 
performance of safety 
functions? 
How are these factors 
and their impacts 
interconnected? 
Which are the most 
significant factors to be 
included in scenarios? 
Which are consistent 
combinations of the 
included factors? 
Which combinations 
cover the evolution of 
the system 
“adequately”? 
Which scenarios are 
included in the 
assessment? 
How are these 
scenarios quantified 
for the assessment? 
Do the selected 
scenarios and 
quantifications cover 
the range of expected 
evolution 
“adequately”? 
Are the models and input 
data consistent with 
scenarios? 
What does the impact 
modelling tell about the 
expected evolution of the 
system and its impacts? 
What does the analysis 
results not tell? (What was 
excluded in the preceding 
steps?) 
How reliable is the result? 
What are the sources of 
unreliability? 
Is there a need for 
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repository system? 
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mechanisms be 
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What are the 
consequences of the 
events? 
How reliable is the result? 
What are the sources of 
unreliability? 
Is there a need for 








The challenges in relation to modelling and especially questions concerning its reliability and 
possible sources of error are beyond this report’s scope. However, we want to make some 
general remarks about this topic. The disposal facility can be considered as an autonomous 
system because its safety is essentially based on the laws of nature, not on human control or 
corrective measures. The laws of nature also control the phenomena that take place in the 
system and affect its evolution. Laws of nature, as used here, means the set of interlinked 
fundamental groups of mathematical equations that are used to model the evolution of the 
system. The equations will remain the same for the period to be studied. Any disturbances 
affecting the system can be treated in modelling as changing parameter values and/or 
boundary conditions of the set of equation groups. 
Considering external FEPs as factors disturbing the evolution of the disposal facility, it may be 
useful to see that no matter when the disturbance occurs, its effect is to shift the state of the 
disposal facility to a new position, either instantaneously or by starting a gradual process. After 
the disturbance, the laws of nature will start acting on the system. The final state of the system 
will depend on the initial state, the possible disturbance(s) and the time the laws of nature act 
on the system. The quantitative difference between Scenario A and Scenario B concerning the 
final state of the system is defined by how the scenarios are parametrised and how the impact 
assessment is done in practice.  
 By definition, disturbance scenarios are expected to analyse unlikely events impairing the 
long-term safety of a nuclear waste repository. Therefore, these scenarios can be seen as 
being similar to what Börjeson et al. (2006) defined as what-if scenarios. These scenarios 
investigate what will happen in some specific conditions. In the case of a nuclear waste 
repository, the task would be to investigate whether radionuclide release is possible if some 
“unlikely event” takes place. The analysis task for this type of scenario is to find out all possible 
“unlikely events” that might impair the performance of the repository system and how this 
impairment happens. Some of the “unlikely events” that need to be analysed are mentioned in 
the guideline (STUK 2018, paragraph 316). But for a complete analysis, it might be necessary 
to enhance the explorative element and use methods that promote brainstorming or other idea-
generating approaches. In this kind of ideation, the combination of expertise and a wider range 
of background knowledge may produce better results than being limited to a very homogenous 
pool of expertise. Understanding the mechanism of influence is very important because it has 
an effect on how the assessment step should be carried out. It is necessary to understand 
whether the effect is a short-term disturbance or a trigger for a slower long-term change and 
how wide the affected zone in the system is. All these issues have an effect on the modelling 
and parametrisation of the scenarios. 
Our analysis of the nuclear waste repository scenarios concludes that this task requires 
systematic approaches that involve normative and explorative elements. Similar approaches 
were found in the literature review in alternatives we call scenario analysis and safety analysis. 
These approaches combine scenarios and model-based impact assessment. They utilise 
systematic, mathematical methods in scenario development, but brainstorming or other types 
of idea generation or workshop approaches may be essential for improving the explorative 
aspect of analysis. It is characteristic of systematic scenario development methods that in the 
analysis of complex systems, the number of scenarios becomes large. Therefore, the selection 
of scenarios for the impact assessment step becomes a crucial question. The scope of 
produced knowledge decreases in every step of the process, but this is an unavoidable issue 
in the scenario analysis. The challenge is to find an acceptable balance between the scope of 
the analysis and an efficient use of resources (human resources, funding available, time).   
It is characteristic of scenario studies that the process design and selection of methodological 
approaches need to be done every time for the specific application case. Even the formal 
scenario methods always require the implementation of expert processes, and process 
designs may require a compromise due to resource availability or other external reasons. The 
nuclear waste repository creates a challenging task for scenario analysis due to its safety-
critical character and the long time-frame required for the analysis. Also, the multidisciplinary 
 




character of phenomena present in the system brings extra complexity to the analysis. 
Therefore, it is evident that the scenario method for a nuclear waste repository should be some 
kind of hybrid, combining aspects from different scenario approaches. This hybrid method 
should be developed by combining methodological expertise with the subject-matter expertise 
of the nuclear waste community.  
We wish that the epistemic scenario framework could also contribute to the methodological 
development. We developed the framework in order to be able to combine and compare 
different scenario approaches that appeared in different disciplinary fields. However, it is 
important to note that we do not propose the framework to be a classification tool that would 
identify some “pure” types or classes of scenarios. Instead, we wish that it could be useful for 
evaluating the scenario problem at hand, and this evaluation would guide the identification of 
relevant scenario approaches. The epistemic approach promotes thinking of the limitations 
and strengths of different approaches in knowledge creation. Another possible use would be 
for evaluating scenario processes from the knowledge creation perspective. Success in 
knowledge creation is always a wider question than just making the right choices in the 
selection of methodologies. In addition to that, it covers issues related to the organisation of 
the process where these methods are applied as well as questions about how outcomes are 
communicated and used in decision-making. 
Figure 10 shows how the epistemic scenario framework could serve the evaluative purpose in 
the field of nuclear waste management. As the knowledge that is created by scenario analysis 
is connected to the safety assessment of the nuclear waste repository, it is important to 
emphasize the normative element of such analysis. In this context, the central questions are 
to ensure that the analysis is adequate for the purpose, but also that its results are 
understandable for those who need the information. The selected method and rigour in its 
application can have a role in the first aspect, but the latter one is something that concerns 
questions of communication and how well the results are explained and evaluated. One 
outcome of our analysis was that the normative aspect of scenario analysis is often interwoven 
with explorative aspects, and therefore the process and selected methods and implementation 
processes are central in ensuring the explorative outcome. 
 
Figure 10. Using the epistemic framework for evaluative purposes. 
This study was able to provide only a limited approach to the scenario method and its role in 
nuclear waste management. In the following, we discuss a few limitations of this study and 
possible questions for further research. 
 




1) The integrative literature approach adopted in this study did not allow for comparative 
analyses in relation to the scenario method. Such questions as temporal changes in 
the application of various scenario approaches in one field or quantitative comparisons 
of the prevalence of different scenario approaches across different fields are beyond 
the scope of the selected qualitative approach. For these types of questions, a 
quantitative bibliometric analysis would be a better methodological choice. On the other 
hand, the epistemic approach of this study was limited to the rather practical level of 
combining knowledge purposes and methods of knowledge production. Especially in 
the context of nuclear waste management, there would be space for more extended 
epistemological and ethical considerations. An example of such questions is how 
scenario knowledge involves the inter-generational aspects inherent in nuclear waste 
management. 
2) Another limitation of this study, and a possible topic for further research, is to widen the 
practitioner’s perspective. This study was based only on written sources, and the 
review of scenario approaches of the nuclear community relied mainly on documents 
produced by international organisations and authorities. Closer contact with the nuclear 
waste management community (by including interview data in the analysis, for 
example) or a more extended and directed literature search would increase the 
understanding of possible constraints and challenges related to scenario studies in the 
nuclear waste management field. One interesting aspect in relation to this topic might 
be a temporal analysis of how the scenario approach in the nuclear waste field evolved. 
For example, Finnish decision-making on nuclear waste management is done in 
phases, and every phase should produce an improved version of the safety case. This 
also indicates that the database and role of scenarios should evolve with successively 
updated safety cases. With this in mind, it is noteworthy that according to Tosoni et al. 
(2018), many recent international safety cases have ended up in relatively similar 
scenarios based on a limited set of FEPs. A question for further research would be, 
‘What practices and conditions in the field produce such an outcome?’ 
3) A third possible point of departure for further research would be to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice in relation to scenario-making. This study increased the 
preparedness for an integrative approach from a theoretical perspective, but for 
complete integration of theory and practice, a different research design would be 
necessary. As scenario-making is integrally connected to the application context, one 
possibility would be to apply the principles of action research. Action research is a 
social scientific research approach that aspires to developmental goals with a 
simultaneous action process (e.g. in a participant organisation) and research linked 
together by critical reflection. This kind of research design would enable better 
integration with the practitioners who keep safety in their focus in their daily practice 
and possibly find improved ways to provide practical support for managerial decision-
making and utilisation of the ideas stemming from a theoretical view on scenarios.  
 




References   
Alizadeh, R., & Soltanisehat, L. (2020). Stay competitive in 2035: a scenario-based method 
to foresight in the design and manufacturing industry. Foresight, 22(3), 309–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-06-2019-0048 
Awopone, A. K., Zobaa, A. F., & Banuenumah, W. (2017). Techno-economic and 
environmental analysis of power generation expansion plan of ghana. Energy Policy, 
104, 13-22. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.034 
Aziz, A., Ahmed, S., Khan, F.I. (2019). An ontology-based methodology for hazard 
identification and causation analysis. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 
123, pp. 87-98. Barker, K. E., Cox, D., & Sveinsdottir, T. (2011). Foresight on the 
future of public research metrology in Europe. Foresight, 13(1), 5–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14636681111109660 
Baldissone, G., Fissore, D., Demichela, M. (2016). Catalytic after-treatment of lean VOC-air 
streams: Process intensification vs. plant reliability, Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 100, pp. 208-219.  
Bishop, P., Hines, A., & Collins, T. (2007). The current state of scenario development: an 
overview of techniques. Foresight 
Bowman, G. (2016). The practice of scenario planning: an analysis of inter‐and intra‐
organizational strategizing. British Journal of Management, 27(1), 77-96. 
Bradfield, R., Wright, G., Burt, G., Cairns, G., & Van Der Heijden, K. (2005). The origins and 
evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning. Futures, 37(8), 
795–812.  
Bubbico, R., Greco, V., Menale, C. (2018). Hazardous scenarios identification for Li-ion 
secondary batteries. Safety Science, 108, pp. 72-88.  
Börjeson, L., Höjer, M., Dreborg, K. H., Ekvall, T., & Finnveden, G. (2006). Scenario types 
and techniques: Towards a user’s guide. Futures, 38(7), 723–739.  
Cameron, I., Mannan, S., Németh, E., Park, S., Pasman, H., Rogers, W., Seligmann, B. 
(2017). Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: Are the 
conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better? Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection, 110, pp. 53-70.Crawford, M. M. (2019). A 
comprehensive scenario intervention typology. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 149(September), 119748. 
Das, A., Halder, A., Mazumder, R., Saini, V. K., Parikh, J., & Parikh, K. S. (2018). 
Bangladesh power supply scenarios on renewables and electricity import. Energy 
(Oxford), 155, 651-667. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2018.04.169 
Ducot, G., & Lubben, G. J. (1980). A typology for scenarios. Futures, 12(1), 51–57.  
Durbach, I. N., & Stewart, T. J. (2012). Modeling uncertainty in multi-criteria decision 
analysis. European journal of operational research, 223(1), 1-14. 








Folhes, R. T., Aguiar, A. P. D. de, Stoll, E., Dalla-Nora, E. L., Araújo, R., Coelho, A., & Canto, 
O. do. (2015). Multi-scale participatory scenario methods and territorial planning in 
the Brazilian Amazon. Futures, 73, 86–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2015.08.005 
Godet, M. (2000). The art of scenarios and strategic planning: tools and 
pitfalls. Technological forecasting and social change, 65(1), 3-22. 
Government, 1999, Government Decision (478/1999) on the safety of disposal of nuclear 
waste http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1999/19990478, VnP 478/199 (in Finnish). 
Government, 2008, Government Decree (736/2008) on the safety of disposal of nuclear 
waste https://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2008/en20080736.pdf, VNA 736/2008. 
Guo, Y., Zhu, W., Yang, Y., & Cheng, H. (2019). Carbon reduction potential based on life 
cycle assessment of China’s aluminium industry-a perspective at the province level. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 239, 118004. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118004 
Haimes, Y.Y., Kaplan, S., Lambert, J.H. (2002). Risk filtering, ranking, and management 
framework using hierarchical holographic modelling. Risk Analysis, 22 (2), pp. 383-
397.  
Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Van Oosterhout, J. (2001). To boldly go where no man has gone 
before: Integrating cognitive and physical features in scenario studies. Futures, 
33(10), 861–872.  
IAEA, 2012.The Safety Case and Safety Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste. 
Specific Safety Guide. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-23. (https://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1553_web.pdf). 
Jain, P., Rogers, W.J., Pasman, H.J., Mannan, M.S. (2018). A resilience-based integrated 
process systems hazard analysis (RIPSHA) approach: Part II management system 
layer. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 118, pp. 115-124.  
Kaufmann, S., & Lohaus, M. (2018). Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of 
transatlantic relations. Futures, 97, 18–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.04.007 
Kotir, J. H., Smith, C., Brown, G., Marshall, N., & Johnstone, R. (2016). A system dynamics 
simulation model for sustainable water resources management and agricultural 
development in the Volta river basin, Ghana. The Science of the Total Environment, 
573, 444-457. doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2016.08.081 
Kuzmina, K., Prendeville, S., Walker, D., & Charnley, F. (2019). Future scenarios for fast-
moving consumer goods in a circular economy. Futures, 107, 74–88. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.12.001 
Lettner, M., Schöggl, J., & Stern, T. (2017). Factors influencing the market diffusion of bio-
based plastics: Results of four comparative scenario analyses. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 157, 289-298. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.04.077 
Levesque, A., Pietzcker, R. C., Baumstark, L., De Stercke, S., Grübler, A., & Luderer, G. 
(2018). How much energy will buildings consume in 2100? A global perspective 
within a scenario framework. Energy (Oxford), 148, 514-527. 
doi:10.1016/j.energy.2018.01.139 
Lin, B., & Wang, X. (2014). Promoting energy conservation in China's iron & steel sector. 
Energy (Oxford), 73, 465-474. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2014.06.036 
 




Luo, M., Song, X., Hu, S., & Chen, D. (2019). Towards the sustainable development of waste 
household appliance recovery systems in china: An agent-based modeling approach. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 220, 431-444. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.02.128 
Luukkanen, J., Akgün, O., Kaivo-oja, J., Korkeakoski, M., Pasanen, T., Panula-Ontto, J., & 
Vehmas, J. (2015). Long-run energy scenarios for Cambodia and Laos: Building an 
integrated techno-economic and environmental modelling framework for scenario 
analyses. Energy (Oxford), 91, 866-881. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2015.08.091 
McDowall, W. (2014). Exploring possible transition pathways for hydrogen energy: A hybrid 
approach using socio-technical scenarios and energy system modelling. Futures, 63, 
1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2014.07.004 
Merrie, A., Keys, P., Metian, M., & Österblom, H. (2018). Radical ocean futures-scenario 
development using science fiction prototyping. Futures, 95, 22–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.09.005 
Moonis, M., Wilday, A.J., Wardman, M.J. (2010). Semi-quantitative risk assessment of 
commercial scale supply chain of hydrogen fuel and implications for industry and 
society, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 88 (2), pp. 97-108.  
Mustonen, S. M. (2010). Rural energy survey and scenario analysis of village energy 
consumption: A case study in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Energy Policy, 
38(2), 1040-1048. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.10.056 
NEA 2019, International Features, Events, and Processes (IFEP) List for the Deep 
Geological Disposal of Radioactive waste, Version 3.0, OECD NEA Radioactive 
Waste Management Committee, 165 p. 
NEA, 2012. Methods for Safety Assessment of Geological Disposal Facilities for Radioactive 
Waste. Outcomes of the NEA MeSA Initiative. ISBN 978-92-64-99190-
3.(http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/2012/nea6923-MESA-initiative.pdf). 
Nielsen, S. K., & Karlsson, K. (2007). Energy scenarios: a review of methods, uses and 
suggestions for improvement. International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 27(3), 
302-322.  
Oedewald, P., Pietikäinen, E. and Reiman, T. (2011). 3. A guidebook for evaluating 
organizations in the nuclear industry – an example of safety culture evaluation. 
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Research Report 2011:20.  
Paltrinieri, N., Khan, F., Amyotte, P., Cozzani, V. (2014). Dynamic approach to risk 
management: Application to the Hoeganaes metal dust accidents, Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection, 92 (6), pp. 669-679.  
Paltrinieri, N., Wilday, J., Wardman, M., Cozzani, V. (2014). Surface installations intended for 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Atypical accident scenarios and their 
identification. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 92 (1), pp. 93-107.  
Panos, E., & Kannan, R. (2016). The role of domestic biomass in electricity, heat and grid 
balancing markets in Switzerland. Energy (Oxford), 112, 1120-1138. 
doi:10.1016/j.energy.2016.06.107 
Posiva & SKB, 2017.Safety functions, performance targets and technical design criteria for a 
KBS 3V repository. Conclusions and recommendations from a joint SKB and Posiva 
working group. Posiva SKB Report 01, 116. 
 




Poteri, A. 2013, Simplifying solute transport modelling of the geological multi-barrier disposal 
system. VTT Science: 42, VTT, Espoo, 2013, 63 p. + app. 141 p. ISBN 978-951-38-
8097-2 (Softback ed.), 978-951-38-8098-9 (PDF) 
http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/science/2013/S42.pdf 
Raele, R., Boaventura, J. M. G., Fischmann, A. A., & Sarturi, G. (2014). Scenarios for the 
second generation ethanol in Brazil. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
87, 205–223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.12.010 
Ramírez, R., Österman, R., & Grönquist, D. (2013). Scenarios and early warnings as 
dynamic capabilities to frame managerial attention. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 80(4), 825–838. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.10.029 
Rasilainen, K., Gharbieh, H., Olin, M. & Ylönen M. 2019, Safety case methodology for 
nuclear waste disposal - possible update considerations for Finnish usage, VTT 
Technology 364, 36 p. + app. 1 p., https://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/technology/2019/T364.pdf 
Rasilainen, K., Gharbieh, H., Olin, M. & Ylönen M. 2019, Safety case methodology for 
nuclear waste disposal - possible update considerations for Finnish usage, VTT 
Technology 364, 36 p. + app. 1 p., https://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/technology/2019/T364.pdf 
Reiman, T. and Oedewald, P. (2009). Evaluating safety critical organizations. Focus on the 
nuclear industry. Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Research Report 2009:12.  
Roubelat, F. (2006). Scenarios to challenge strategic paradigms: Lessons from 2025. 
Futures, 38(5), 519–527. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2005.09.001 
Saswattecha, K., Kroeze, C., Jawjit, W., & Hein, L. (2017). Improving environmental 
sustainability of Thai palm oil production in 2050. Journal of Cleaner Production, 147, 
572-588. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.01.137 
Snyder, H. (2019). Literature review as a research methodology: An overview and guidelines. 
Journal of Business Research, 104, 333-339. 
Soetanto, R., Dainty, A. R. J., Goodier, C. I., & Austin, S. A. (2011). Unravelling the 
complexity of collective mental models: A method for developing and analysing 
scenarios in multi-organisational contexts. Futures, 43(8), 890–907. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2011.06.013 
Soria-Lara, J. A., & Banister, D. (2018). Collaborative backcasting for transport policy 
scenario building. Futures, 95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.09.003 
STUK, 2018. Guide YVL D.5. Disposal of nuclear waste, 39 p. + app 4, 
(https://www.stuklex.fi/en/ohje/YVLD-5 ). 
STUK, 2018b, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Disposal 
of Nuclear Waste, REGULATION STUK Y/4/2018, 
https://www.stuklex.fi/en/maarays/stuk-y-4-2018. 
Talberg, A., Thomas, S., & Wiseman, J. (2018). A scenario process to inform Australian 
geoengineering policy. Futures, 101, 67–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.06.003 
TEM, 2019, Nuclear Energy Act, 
https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1987/en19870990.pdf 
Torraco, R. J. (2005). Writing integrative literature reviews: Guidelines and examples. Human 
resource development review, 4(3), 356-367. 
 




Tosoni, E., Salo, A. & Zio, E. 2018. Scenario Analysis for the Safety Assessment of Nuclear 
Waste Repositories: A Critical Review. Risk Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 755-776 
(DOI: 10.1111/risa.12889) 
Tourki, Y., Keisler, J., & Linkov, I. (2013). Scenario analysis: a review of methods and 
applications for engineering and environmental systems. Environment Systems & 
Decisions, 33(1), 3-20. 
Trost, T., Sterner, M., & Bruckner, T. (2017). Impact of electric vehicles and synthetic 
gaseous fuels on final energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions in Germany 
based on long-term vehicle fleet modelling. Energy (Oxford), 141, 1215-1225. 
doi:10.1016/j.energy.2017.10.006 
Turunen, J., Pohjola, J. & Lipping, T. 2018, Sensitivity analysis of radionuclide transport in 
biosphere analysis. STUK-A261. Salomaa, S, Lusa, M. & Vaaramaa, K. (eds.). Cores 
Symposium on Radiation in the Environment - Scientific Achievements and 
Challenges for the Society, 16-17.4.2018, Helsinki, Finland. 
http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978‐952‐309‐425-3 
Ulusçu, Ö.S., Özbaş, B., Altiok, T., Or, I. (2009). Risk analysis of the vessel traffic in the strait 
of Istanbul. Risk Analysis, 29 (10), pp. 1454-1472.   
van Notten, P. W. F., Rotmans, J., van Asselt, M. B. A., & Rothman, D. S. (2003). An 
updated scenario typology. Futures, 35(5), 423–443.  
Varho, V., & Tapio, P. (2013). Combining the qualitative and quantitative with the Q2 
scenario technique - The case of transport and climate. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 80(4), 611–630. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.09.004 
Vignes, A., Muñoz, F., Bouillard, J., Dufaud, O., Perrin, L., Laurent, A., Thomas, D. (2012). 
Risk assessment of the ignitability and explosivity of aluminum nanopowders. 
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 90 (4), pp. 304-310. 
Volkery, A., & Ribeiro, T. (2009). Scenario planning in public policy: Understanding use, 
impacts and the role of institutional context factors. Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change, 76(9), 1198-1207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2009.07.009 
WENRA, 2014, Report Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities Safety Reference Levels - 22 
December 2014, Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), 
Working Group on Waste and Decommissioning (WGWD) 
http://www.wenra.org/media/filer_public/2015/03/18/srl_disposal_final_version_2014_
12_22.pdf 
Wilday, J., Paltrinieri, N., Farret, R., Hebrard, J., Breedveld, L. (2011b). Addressing emerging 
risks using carbon capture and storage as an example. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 89 (6), pp. 463-471.  
Wilday, J., Wardman, M., Johnson, M., Haines, M. (2011a). Hazards from carbon dioxide 
capture, transport and storage. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 89 (6), 
pp. 482-491.  
Wilkinson, A., & Eidinow, E. (2008). Evolving practices in environmental scenarios: A new 
scenario typology. Environmental Research Letters, 3(4).  
Wilkinson, A., Kupers, R., & Mangalagiu, D. (2013). How plausibility-based scenario 
practices are grappling with complexity to appreciate and address 21st century 
challenges. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 80(4), 699–710.  
 




Williams, B. (2020) Hierarchical holographic modelling and the theory of scenario structuring, 
Available at https://www.briangwilliams.us/global-catastrophic-risks/hierarchical-
holographic-modelling-and-the-theory-of-scenario-structuring.html  
 Winkler, J., & Moser, R. (2016). Coping with strategic uncertainty: framework development 
and scenario derivation for a JV decision in the Russian truck industry. Foresight, 
18(4), 357–378. https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-01-2016-0002 
Wright, D., Stahl, B., & Hatzakis, T. (2020). Policy scenarios as an instrument for 
policymakers. Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 154, 119972. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.119972 
Xin, P., Khan, F., Ahmed, S. (2017). Dynamic hazard identification and scenario mapping 
using Bayesian network. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 105, pp. 143-
155. 
Yokokawa, N., Kikuchi-Uehara, E., Sugiyama, H., & Hirao, M. (2018). Framework for 
analyzing the effects of packaging on food loss reduction by considering consumer 
behavior. Journal of Cleaner Production, 174, 26-34. 
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.10.242 
Zahraei, S. M., Kurniawan, J. H., & Cheah, L. (2019). A foresight study on urban mobility: 
Singapore in 2040. Foresight, 22(1), 37–52. https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-05-2019-0044 
Zegras, C., & Rayle, L. (2012). Testing the rhetoric: An approach to assess scenario 
planning's role as a catalyst for urban policy integration. Futures, 44(4), 303–318. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2011.10.013 
Zhu, C., Fan, R., & Lin, J. (2020). The impact of renewable portfolio standard on retail 
electricity market: A system dynamics model of tripartite evolutionary game. Energy 
Policy, 136, 111072. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111072 
